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ABSTRACT
Liquidated damages provisions are the most common mechanism used in construction contracts
to enforce the contractor to meet the contract's milestones and to compensate the Owner for
losses in case of the contractor's late performance. This mechanism is traditionally used in
public projects and is generally effective when applied to projects with a well-defined scope of
work that is less likely to be changed (by the Owner, the designer, differing site conditions, or by
a third party) during construction.
A multi-contract project, such as the Central Artery/Tunnel (CA/T) Project in Boston is often
more complex, schedule-sensitive, with a dynamic, ever changing scope of work, and is more
vulnerable to changes and to influences by many stakeholders. Liquidated damages provisions
in multi-contract projects are ineffective, and Owners of those projects need to look for
alternatives to these provisions. To be beneficial to the Owner of a multi-contract project, any
alternative provision should take into account the dynamic nature of the project and the high
possibility of delays to occur.
Alternative provisions that have been successfully used in construction contracts in the United
States and in other countries, including: incentive/disincentive clauses, biding on time and cost,
and tying periodic payments to the contractor's schedule performance of certain contract
milestone(s), are studied and their applicability to multi-contract projects is analyzed.
Incentive/disincentive provisions are found not to achieve its purpose and perhaps to cause more
claims if applied to a multi-contract project. Bidding on time and cost was also found to be hard
to implement. Several approaches to tie payment to performance of milestone(s) are presented
as valid mechanisms that can be successfully implemented on multi-contract projects such as the
CA/T Project.
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I. Introduction
A. Background and Objective
Many construction projects finish behind schedule, and as a result, Owners often suffer
financial loss. Because of inherent additional complexity, a multi-contract project is usually
more vulnerable to schedule overruns.
Liquidated damages provisions are the most common mechanism used to compensate the
Owner for losses caused by the contractor's failure to complete the project on time. The Owner
has to estimate actual damages and include the estimated per diem amount in the contract
documents.
By establishing a predefined amount beforehand and therefore eliminating the uncertainty of
actual damages, liquidated damages provisions also help the contractor. The contractor can
account for liquidated damages based on its own analysis of the risk of overrunning the schedule.
Despite their benefits to the contractor and the Owner, liquidated damages provisions
have major disadvantages. They are difficult to estimate, hard to administer, expensive to
enforce if challenged in court, and can create a hostile environment between the Owner and the
contractor.
Alternative mechanisms to liquidated damages are often used to overcome liquidated
damages limitations and disadvantages. Several forms of incentive provisions had been used to
replace/supplement liquidated damages provisions. The major advantage of incentive provisions
is to encourage and award the contractor performance.
The purpose of this paper is to study the use of, as well as alternatives to liquidated
damages in construction contracts. The Central Artery /Tunnel (CA/T) Project is used for
illustration throughout this work. Liquidated damages estimating and documenting procedures
will be discussed using the model implemented on the CA/T Project. Several court cases will be
introduced to illustrate the legal principles of liquidated damages provisions. Disadvantages and
limitations of liquidated damages, especially in multi-contract projects, with emphasis on the
CA/T Project will be discussed. Finally alternatives to liquidated damages provisions that had
been successfully used in construction contracts will be introduced along with several initiatives
which have been studied to be used on the CA/T Project.
B. The Central Artery/Tunnel (CA/T) Project
The Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel (CA/T) Project in Boston is the largest highway
construction job ever undertaken in the United States. The project's original plan proposed in
1968 was to construct a third harbor tunnel crossing from Boston to Logan Airport to supplement
the 1934 Sumner Tunnel, and the 1961 Callahan Tunnel. It has grown to a mega-project linking
a third harbor tunnel with a depressed central artery through Boston with connections to
interstate 1-90, 1-93, and 1-95.
Debates over the need for the third tunnel, the location of the tunnel, and the number of
lanes it would provide delayed the approval of the plan. In 1972, the state proposed depressing
the elevated central artery. In 1977, the state proposed one combined project to depress the
artery and construct a third harbor tunnel. In 1985, the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) approved the environmental impact study for the combined artery/tunnel project and
listed 14 unresolved issues to be addressed in a supplemental environmental impact study. In the
same year, the state awarded overall management services of the project to the joint venture's
firm of Bechtel Civil Inc. and Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade and Douglas (B/PB).
The CA/T Project will replace the six-lane, elevated road through downtown Boston
known as the "Central Artery", with an eight to ten lane underground highway, provide a four
lane third tunnel joining Logan Airport to the Massachusetts Turnpike 1-90, and construct a cable
bridge crossing Charles River to the north to establish a new connection to 1-93 and 1-95. The
third harbor tunnel was finished in December 1995.
The existing artery was constructed between 1954 and 1959, as part of a transportation
program for the Boston region which was generated early in the post-World War II period. It
was built as a "collector - distributor" roadway whose design reflected the requirements of
locally oriented service, with many closely spaced on and off ramps. It was designed to handle
projected traffic volumes that are obviously far less than the current level. The need for the
CA/T Project stemmed from the inability of the existing central artery and Sumner and Callahan
tunnels to accommodate both current and future traffic demands.
The entire project is scheduled to be completed in 2004 with at an estimated cost of $10.4
billion. Design started in 1985, and construction commenced in 1992. The project is estimated
to employ 5,000 workers. The CA/T Project has hundreds of contractors working under a joint
venture of Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff (B/PB). B/PB is the Construction Management
consultant which is managing the CA/T Project for the Massachusetts Highway Department
(MHD), the project's Owner.
1. Interfaces Between Contracts on the CA/T Project
The CA/T Project is being delivered through hundreds of contracts, which establish
interface among hundreds of design and construction tasks - figure (I-1) depicts the CA/T
Project's general layout map which demonstrates the Project's major contracts and their physical
boundary interfaces.
Figure (I- 1)
The following examples of interfaces on the CA/T Project contracts illustrate that on the
CA/T Project as well as on multi-contract projects time is of the essence. Delays and lack-of
performance by any party could have substantial cost damages to the Project.
1.1 Example I
A demolition contract was awarded to demolish the existing Minot Steam Plant, beside
the Registry of Motor Vehicles building on Nashua Street. This work clears the site for a follow
on contractor to construct a boat section, and two transition structures in this area. Failure of the
first contractor to finish the demolition on time will deny the follow on contractor access to start
work in this area, which is on its critical path.
1.2 Example 2
A utilities contract was awarded to relocate utility lines and abandon existing lines in
surface roads to allow various follow on main line tunnel contractors to demolish the abandoned
lines during pre-trenching and guide wall construction for slurry wall excavation. A delay by the
utility contractor will impact the most critical main line contracts to follow, and could delay
overall project milestones.
1.3 Example 3
A common interface issue, which requires a great deal of coordination on the CA/T
Project Project, is planning interface between laydown areas. Due to the location of its work in
the downtown of one of the major cities in the country, the CA/T Project struggles to make
available enough laydown areas for its contractors. Contract documents usually specify the
duration the contractor can occupy certain work and laydown areas within the vicinity of its
work. After that period the contractor will have to turn over the area(s) to the follow on
contractor. If the first contractor fails to vacate the required areas on time, the follow-on
contractor can suffer significant delays and additional costs, as a result of materials double
handling, delivery delays and additional off site storage.
1.4 Example 4
The CA/T Project contracts require a significant effort in traffic management. Some
contracts have dates certain in order to make traffic relocations possible. If the planned traffic
shift is delayed by one of the contractors involved in the implementation, all other contractors,
which are otherwise mobilized and crewed to shift traffic, will be impacted.
1.5 Example 5
A contract includes the construction of a temporary bridge from Leverett Circle to the
existing 1-93 on-ramp behind the Fleet Center. This temporary bridge will be used by the traffic
currently using the existing Leverett Circle on-ramp to 1-93. A follow on contractor can then
demolish the existing 1-93 on-ramp and build a segment of a tunnel on its location. A delay in
constructing and directing traffic to the new temporary bridge will delay the construction of the
tunnel segment by the follow on contractor which can suffer potential cost impact.
1. 6 Example 6
Many contracts on the CA/T Project include in their scope of work the construction of
interim power facilities, which are then used by follow-on contracts to supply power for
construction activities as well as lighting and signs for finished structures ready for initial
opening to ease traffic before the final completion of the Project in 2004
1.7 Example 7
Most of the viaducts on the project are awarded in pieces to different contracts. Some of
the bents on a long viaduct will be shared by spans on either side, which may belong to different
contracts. A great deal of coordination and proper planning are mandatory to reduce potential
conflicts and consequence delays and claims. The shared bent must be built on schedule to allow
the follow on contractor to erect its span. The follow on contractor must provide its bearings
details and templates to the preceding contractor to ensure proper installation of the bent for the
follow on contractor's bearings and span. In some cases, the follow on contractor will also need
to erect its span on schedule to allow the preceding contractor to install the expansion joint.
Failure of either contractor to turn over its scope of work on the contractual specified date could
result in expensive equipment loss as well as disruption to the erection process. It could also
cause delay to the follow-on contract and the whole project milestones.
1.8 Example 8
Some of the scope of work on the CA/T Project is done by force account contractors
hired and paid directly by the Department. Examples are certain utility work, which is usually
done by the utility company that owns it, certain work in MBTA and AMTRAK stations and
railyards, some geotechnical instrumentation installation and readings work, as well as some
contaminated soil exploration and analysis. Most of the force account work is preparatory work
to allow for the follow-on contractor(s) to start and therefore a delay could mean a late start and
potential cost and time overruns.
C. Delays in Multi-contract Construction Projects
The likelihood of a construction project to overrun its planned schedule is high, and many
construction projects are not completed on time. Delays can be caused by the Owner, the
contractor, and/or a third party.
In the construction industry, more than in any other business, projects are characterized
by uncertainty. Each construction project is unique. Even two typical projects will at least vary
in location; and different locations would translate to different site conditions, different
economical, labor, political and environmental challenges.
For this very reason of uncertainty, it is often impossible, even for construction
professionals with extensive expertise, to estimate a project duration with a great degree-of
confidence. A project schedule is usually established to account for each project unique
circumstances and to accommodate the Owner's needs. The schedule then becomes a goal and
most of the time meeting this goal requires a great deal of planning and proper resource
allocation on the contractor part.
Meeting the contract's schedule becomes even a tougher task on multi-contract projects.
Multi-contract projects are usually large projects that are divided into separate contracts for a
variety of reasons. Sometimes, a project will be divided into several contracts simply to take
advantage of fast tracking. On other projects, such as the CA/T Project, in addition to fast
tracking, because of the contract size, it is impossible to package the whole project as one
contract. For one reason, it will be difficult to find many contractors with the bonding capacity
to undertake such a multi-billion dollars job. This will reduce competition and increase bid
prices. Working on a manageable size contracts makes it easier to package, award, and finish
contracts early to prepare for follow-on contracts, to make construction progress and gain public
and political support, to set the tune with abutters and agencies, and to provide feed back and
regarding the assumptions made by the designers to incorporate into the in-progress design for
the remainder of the project contracts.
1. Types of Delays
Delays of construction projects are classified into two categories. excusable and
inexcusable delays.
Excusable delays are delays to the construction project attributed to causes beyond the
control of the contractor, and therefore justify a contractual modification (i.e. time extension).
Excusable delays can be caused by the Owner such as design changes, requirement of
changes to contract documents, failure to approve shop drawings within the time stipulated in the
contract documents, failure to respond to the contractor's Request For Information (RFI) on a
timely manner, failure to turn over the contract site (in whole or in part) on the dates specified by
the contract, delays caused by other contracts due to failure of the Owner to coordinate the work
properly, failure to obtain adequate financing, the Owner's suspension of work when contractor
is at no fault, the Owner's failure to furnish materials and/or equipment promised under the
contract, the Owner's failure to complete any force account work specified in the contract
documents.
Excusable delays can also be caused by forces beyond the Owner or the contractor, such
as acts of God, differing site conditions, a third party's intervention, abnormal weather
conditions, war, and labor strikes.
Excusable delays usually entitle the contractor to time extension to its contractual
milestone dates and could be compensable or not-compensable. A compensable delay allows the
contractor to recover any additional costs it has incurred attributable to such delay.
2. Extra costs to the contractor caused by delays
Compensable (and therefore excusable) delays directly affect the contractor's time-
dependent costs. Time dependent costs are defined as the contractor's costs that are based on the
passage of time rather than actual construction progress. They include field supervision and staff
salary and benefits, job site temporary facilities and utilities, owned and rented equipment, field
supervision vehicles and trucks, maintenance of temporary roads, site weather protection (i.e.
sanding and snow removal), and any other costs associated with the passage of time.
They can also include under recovered home office overhead, and may indirectly cause
claims for escalation in labor rates, materials, and equipment cost.
The contractor may also lose productivity because of disruption. Frequent delays may
force the contractor to start and stop and to work out of sequence. The contractor may suffer
from productivity loss due to time lost in set ups, clean outs, demobilize and mobilize crews,
traveling time, and disrupted normal crew learning curve.
When the Owner directs the contractor to accelerate to recover any excusable delays,
other costs may be incurred by the contractor. Disruption, increased crew size, crowding,
extended shifts, and/or multiple shifts can lead to productivity loss and extra cost to the
contractor.
On the other hand, not-compensable excusable delay does not entitle the contractor to
adjustment in the contract price for any additional costs because of the delay, although the
contractor will ordinarily be granted a time extension. Not-compensable excusable delays are
usually concurrent delays, where delays caused by both the contractor and the Owner occur at
the same time.
Inexcusable delays take place as a result of the contractor's negligence, the contractor's
improper performance, the contractor's inadequate resource allocation, the contractor's poor
management, the contractor's failure to submit shop drawings on time, the contractor's failure to
coordinate work among its vendors and subcontractors, the contractor's failure to plan for
equipment and/or materials that require long lead time for manufacturing and/or delivery,
rejection of deficient work due to failure of the contractor to adhere to the contract provisions.
Inexcusable delays do not entitle the contractor to time extension or cost recovery. On
the contrary, in the absence of concurrent excusable delays, inexcusable delays usually entitle the
Owner to recover costs resulting from the delay
3. Examples of Owner's losses caused by delays
The Owner usually experiences financial losses because of the consequences of any
delay. Certain losses - namely those caused by inexcusable delays - can be recovered by the
Owner from the Contractor.
Damages to the Owner could be economic (i.e., loss of revenue the completed project
was supposed to generate), strategic (i.e., loss of competitive advantage - the Owner would not
be able to tap into new market or product), environmental (i.e., a completed project would have
improved traffic and reduced congestion and pollution), and political (i.e., failure to meet certain
opening date.), road user benefit and inconvenience to the public (i.e. time lost to the public due
to congestion caused by construction, and revenue as well as time lost to businesses and to
individuals that otherwise would have been gained if the new road were in use). Many of the
damages listed above are difficult or impossible to quantify, and hence can not be recovered,
while others can be quantified and recovered.
D. Liquidated Damages
Most contracts include liquidated damage provisions as a mechanism to permit the
Owner to recover costs attributable to inexcusable delays. Liquidated damages are a
contractually stipulated amount to be paid to the Owner in lieu of actual damages (since they are
almost always difficult to determine in advance), if the contractor fails to meet the contract's
milestone dates.
To be enforceable, liquidated damages provisions need to pass two tests. First, the
liquidated damages estimated amount must represent a reasonable pre-estimate of the actual loss
likely to be suffered by the Owner in the event the contractor fails to meet its contractual
obligations. Second, the amount must not be so unreasonably high that it bears no relationship to
any potential loss. If it is too high courts will construe the clause as a penalty, and not enforce its
provisions. The logic behind this result is that the remedy for breach of contract is compensation
not punishment.
Liquidated damages provisions stipulate an amount to be paid to the Owner by the
contractor, if the latter fails to complete the project on time. Usually Liquidated Damages are
tied to the substantial completion date, the date by which Owner is able to use the completed
project for its intended purpose. However, some projects tie Liquidated Damages to the final
acceptance. The final acceptance is issued after the project is taken by the Owner as
substantially complete and a punch list of remaining and defective work is compiled and
completed.
On multi-contract projects, including the CA/T Project, because of the interfaces between
one contract and other contracts and agencies, and because of the Owner's need of various
portions of the project at different times, interim milestones have been established. In these
cases, liquidated damages are also assigned to interim milestones. On the CAT, the majority of
contracts includes milestones and access restraint dates. Each milestone of a contract is an
access restraint in a follow-on contract.
Valid liquidated damages provisions can benefit both the Owner and the contractor by
establishing the contractor's liability exposure for late completion. The Liquidated damages
clause establishes an agreement between the contractor and the Owner for a definite amount to
compensate the Owner for its anticipated financial loss. Absence of this mechanism will require
the Owner, through litigation that can be time consuming and expensive to both parties, to prove
its actual damages. The uncertainty of litigation makes it hard for the contractor to account for
late completion and incorporate the anticipated risk into its bid price. On the other hand
liquidated damages levels the play field for all bidders, while eliminating the uncertainty of the
amount and outcome of actual damages.
There are a few models to estimate liquidated damages. Estimating liquidated damages
becomes a hard task when actual Owner's damages are intangible, and not easy to quantify.
The assessment of liquidated damages becomes especially difficult in multi-contract projects,
where delays affect the subject contractor as well as the follow-on contractors.
Incentive/disincentive provisions can be used as alternative to liquidated damages. The
most common situation for using these provisions is when the Owner does not only lose if the
project delays, but also gains if the project finishes earlier.
II. Elements of Liquidated Damages
A. Introduction
As defined earlier, the liquidated damages clause establishes a remedy to the Owner for
late completion of the contract (or any of its milestones) due to inexcusable delay by the
contractor.
The legal rules regarding application and enforceability of the liquidated damages clause
are well established and evidenced by past court decisions. However, most of the disputes
regarding liquidated damages revolve around two questions: first, when does the liquidated
damages amount cease to be assessed, and second, when is it unenforceable.
This chapter will try to answer these two questions, and to present several court rulings,
which further explain the legal aspects of liquidated damages. Finally, examples of the
liquidated damages clause from the CA/T project as well as different domestic and international
projects will be presented.
B. Legal Aspects of Liquidated Damages
1. Background
To be enforceable, the liquidated damages amount needs to pass two tests: first, the
Owner must be able to prove that the liquidated damages amount is a reasonable pre-estimate
made at the time of contract formation to forecast the actual damages the Owner might incur as a
result of the contractor's late completion of the project, and second, the amount should not be
unreasonably too high when compared to potential damages. As several court decisions will
explain later, failure of the Owner to prove that the liquidated damages amount is a genuine
estimate of the anticipated actual damages will deem such amount to be a penalty to punish the
contractor for the delay and therefore not enforceable in the court of law.
2. Examples of court interpretations of unenforceable liquidated damages clauses
2.1 Unreasonable Estimate
The following cases establish the first legal aspect of liquidated damages. That is that the
liquidated damages clause is unenforceable, if its amount was not based on a genuine estimate of
the anticipated actual damages to be suffered by the Owner in case of a delay.
2.1.1 Case one
Milton Construction Co., Inc. v State ofAlabama Highway Department
568 So. 2d 784 (Ala. 1990)
The State of Alabama Highway Department awarded an interstate highway improvement
contract to Milton Construction Co., Inc. The contract called for liquidated damages of $600 per
day for late completion. The contract also called for a "disincentive/incentive clause". If the
contractor falls behind schedule, for each day of overrun, up to 60 calendar days, the contract
price would be reduced by $5,000 in addition to any liquidated damages assessment. The same
clause also established incentive payments for early completion. Milton completed the project
behind schedule and was assessed both liquidated damages and disincentive payment. Milton
challenged the enforceability of the disincentive clause.
The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the disincentive provision was designed as a
penalty and therefore was unenforceable. The Court said that to be enforceable, a disincentive
clause has to meet the same standards required of liquidated damages provision. The stipulated
amount ($5,000 per day in this case) has to represent a reasonable attempt, at the time of contract
formation, to estimate the actual damages the Owner might incur as a result of contractor breach.
The Court ruled that this disincentive clause could not pass the test, and that the large daily rate
was intended to encourage timely completion by penalizing the contractor for slow performance.
The Highway Department acknowledged that the disincentive rate had been established
arbitrarily. This, combined with the fact that the disincentive payment and liquidated damages
assessment were cumulative, established conclusively that this was an unenforceable penalty.
The Court rejected the Highway Department's argument that Milton had waived the right
to challenge the disincentive provision by accepting incentive payments on other contracts.
The Highway Department then sued Milton for actual damages claiming "road user
costs" caused by the contractor's late completion. The Department cited cases allowing project
Owners to recover actual damages after a liquidated damages clause had been ruled
unenforceable.
The Court ruled against the Department, indicating that in cases where Owners were
allowed to recover actual damages, they had not been able to assess liquidated damages. In this
case, the Department had been allowed to assess liquidated damages, fully compensating it for
late completion of the project.
2.1. 2 Case two
Rohlin Construction Co., Inc. v. City of Hilton
476 N. W2d 78 (Iowa 1991)
The City of Hinton and County of Plymouth, Iowa, awarded three separate highway
resurfacing contracts, ranged from $37,957 to $251,696, to Rohlin Construction Co., Inc. Each
of the three contracts had construction duration of 40 days, and each called for liquidated
damages of $400 per day for late completion.
Rohlin completed two of the contracts behind schedule and was assessed a total of
$32,400 in liquidated damages. Rohlin challenged the enforceability of the liquidated damages
clauses arguing that they constituted unenforceable penalties.
The Owner defended its practice stating that the $400 per day rate was determined after
consultation with the State Department of Transportation. The Department construction manual
called for a sliding daily rate based on the total contract value, however, the three contracts,
which vary widely in total value, had a flat rate of $400 per day for liquidated damages. The
contractor used that discrepancy to argue that the by misapplying the standard formula in the
state manual, the project Owner failed to prove that the liquidated damages amount represents a
reasonable estimate of the anticipated actual damages.
To make matters worse, one of the County's engineers defended the $400 per day rate by
testifying that "we wanted the liquidated damage amount to be sufficient to make the contractor
aware that we need the project completed." This added to the impression that the liquidated
damages provisions were intended to serve as penalties and therefore unenforceable.
The Iowa Supreme Court concluded that liquidated damages clauses in the three contracts
were unenforceable penalties citing that "no witness was called to justify the suggested
liquidated damage amounts contained in the DOT manual schedule. The county Engineer did
not conduct studies or present any other data suggesting that defendants anticipated that the
Government entities and the public could sustain damages equivalent to $400 per day liquidated
damages amount contained in each of the three contract. Therefore, we conclude that the $400
per day liquidated damages clause is an unreasonable amount and therefore a penalty that should
not be enforced."
2.1.3 Case three
Appeal of Fred A. Arnold
ASBCA No. 26867 (January 10, 1986)
Fred A. Arnold was awarded a contract by the Navy to construct a bachelor enlisted
quarters building. Arnold completed the building behind schedule. As a result, the Navy
assessed liquidated damages based on the contract clause, which called for $1,728 per day. This
amount was calculated according to a Navy guideline specifying six dollars per day for each man
to be housed in the facility.
The court ruled that this amount bore no relationship to the foreseeable actual damages
and that at the time of contract formation, the Navy made no effort to measure the actual
damages, and therefore the liquidated damages clause was unenforceable. The Court stated that
"the only witness who could testify on such matters had no idea, at the time of contract
formation, what the Government expected regarding off-base living expenses in the event of
untimely completion. We can only conclude that the losses reflected by the $1,728 per day bore
no relationship to the actual damages experienced and reasonably anticipated. The liquidated
damages are accordingly unenforceable."
2.1.4 Case four
Appeal of Great Western Utility Corp.
ENG BCA No. 4934 (April 5, 1985)
Great Western Utility Corp. was awarded a contract by the Government for the
construction of rest area facilities. The $29,189 contract called for liquidated damages of $143
per day The Government assessed $18,447 liquidated damages against the contractor for his
late completion of the facilities. The Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals ruled
against the Government defense that the daily rate represented the estimated cost of extended
supervision and inspection. The Board concluded that the liquidated damages provision in this
contract was not based on any reasonable forecast of probable damages that might follow a
breach, and therefore that the liquidated damages provision will not be enforced.
2.1.5 Case five
Appeal of Dave's Excavation
ASBCA No. 36161 (June 8, 1988)
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals refused to enforce a liquidated damages
clause based on the Government improper use of its own guidelines when estimating the daily
rate. The contract was to build a computer room and called for liquidated damages of $125 per
day for late completion.
The contractor finished the project 169 days behind schedule and was assessed liquidated
damages. The contractor challenged the enforceability of the liquidated damages provisions,
pointing out that the government guidelines called for liquidated damages rate of only $50 per
day for a contract of that amount.
The Board said that it had no objection to the government's use of standard tables for
estimating liquidated damages, as long as the rates reflect an attempt to predict the actual
damages which would be incurred due to a delay. Once those tables are established, they must
be followed unless there are extenuating circumstances. In this case, the government exceeded
its own standard table rate without any explanation, and therefore the liquidated damages
provision was ruled as unenforceable penalty.
2.1.6 Case six
Appeal of weddle Plumbing & Heating Co.
VABCA No. 2209 (September 27, 1985)
In a similar decision to that of case five, the Veterans Administration Board of Contract
Appeals ruled that liquidated damages clause was unenforceable, saying that the government
improperly misapplied a "Liquidated damages Schedule" found in the VA Procurement
Regulations.
The contract was to install a boiler and called for liquidated damages of $100 per day for
late completion. The VA engineer estimated that the government would lose savings of $45 per
day if the boiler was not operating. To cover other miscellaneous losses, the engineer added $55
per day, which was the Schedule's recommended amount for contracts of that amount.
The board said that this was an improper use of the government own schedule and ruled
the provision unenforceable citing that "to add the recommended amount from the schedule to
the estimated actual damages is to double the estimated loss and can not be permitted."
2.2 Concurrent and Excusable Delays
As the following cases indicate, the liquidated damages clause is unenforceable if the
Owner and the contractor each contributed to the late completion, and the contract could have
been completed on time if it were not for the Owner's delay, or it is not possible to apportion the
contribution between the parties.
This ruling was established by the Supreme Court decision in Robinson v. United States
261 U.S. 486 (1923). The rule is that liquidated damages may be apportioned according to
degree of contribution unless the contract would have been completed on time but for the delay
caused by the Owner.
Needless to add to this, liquidated damages will not be allowed if the delay caused by the
contractor is found to be excusable.
2.2.1 Case one
Appeal of CD. Murray Co., Inc.
ENG BCA No. 5018 (October 31, 1988)
The government awarded a contract to the C.D. Murray Co., Inc. for dredging of a channel. A
delay was caused by the government's failure to promptly establish the ranges and gages for
performing dredging. A concurrent delay was caused by the contractor's inefficient performance
of the work because of a variety of managerial and equipment deficiencies. As a result, the
project was completed behind schedule and the government assessed liquidated damages amount
according to the contract documents.
The Corps of engineers Board of Contract Appeals ruled that liquidated damages may not
be assessed because the contractor and the government both contributed to the delay, and it is
impossible to apportion responsibility.
2.2.2 Case two
Appeal of C G. Norton Co., Inc.
ENG BCA No. 5182 (January 19, 1988)
The government awarded a contract to C.G. Norton Co., Inc. for repair of a fish weir.
A delay was caused by the government's failure to promptly make a decision regarding the
proper design of concrete form bags used to pour columns under water. Additionally, a
concurrent delay was caused by the contractor due to problems from its subcontractor, which is
fabricating the bags. This delayed progress of the work. The government assessed liquidated
damages; meanwhile the contractor challenged the government, seeking it responsible for the
delay.
The Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals said that both parties contributed to
the delay, the government by its design indecision and the contractor through problems with its
subcontractor. The Board ruled that the government may not assess liquidated damages for that
delay and the contractor may not recover delay damages from the government, citing that "when
a delay is caused concurrently by both parties to the contract, the Board will not attempt to
allocate blame. Neither party may hold the other accountable for the period of concurrent
delay."
2.2.3 Case Three
Appeal of J. B. C. Construction Co., Inc.
VABCA No. 1799 (November 7, 1985)
J.B.L. Construction Co., Inc. was awarded a contract to install fire doors and a smoke
detection system in a VA hospital. The specifications were not clear regarding the required
materials and hardware. As a result, it took five months for all shop drawings submittals and
hardware schedule to be approved. The contractor brought a claim for delay damage.
The Veterans Administration Board of Contract Appeals found that the government was
unreasonably slow in responding to submittals. The Board also found that the contractor had not
submitted shop drawings according to the contract schedule and many submittals had been vague
or incomplete. Accordingly, the Board ruled that neither party could hold the other responsible
for the delay citing that "when delays result from a combination of causes, and both parties are at
fault to such extent that it is not possible to determine the degree of guilt of each, the government
loses its right to assess liquidated damages and the contractor loses the right to collect delay
costs."
2.2.4 Case four
Appeal of Sauter Construction Co.
ASBCA No. 27050 (March 30, 1984)
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals refused to allow the government to
assess liquidated damages for a period of time when the government personnel were unavailable
to perform final inspection of the work.
Sauter Construction Co. was assessed liquidated damages for completing construction of
a maintenance shop 43 days after the contractually stipulated date. The contractor argued the
delay was excusable.
The Board found most of the delay to be not excusable. For 14 days, however, no
inspector was available to conduct final inspection; therefore, the liquidated damages were
disallowed for that period.
3. Termination of Liquidated Damages Assessment
As stated before, liquidated damages assessment usually ceases when the scope of work
of the corresponding milestone reaches substantial completion. At this stage, the Owner can
have beneficial use of the project (or the subject portion of the project) for the intended purpose.
However, in some cases, liquidated damages are tied to Final Acceptance. The following cases
will present examples of the Court rulings regarding this issue.
3.1 Case one
Ledbetter Brothers, Inc. v. North Carolina Department of Transportation
314 S.E.2d 761 (N.C. App. 1984)
The North Carolina Department of Transportation awarded a contract to Ledbetter
Brothers, Inc. for highway renovation. The contract called for $300 liquidated damages, which
would be assessed for every day of delay until "completion date" of the work.
The work included reflectorized signs. After the highway was substantially complete and
open for traffic, the Department inspected and rejected the reflectorized signs. The Department
withheld liquidated damages until the signs were replaced and accepted. The contractor
challenged the action arguing that liquidated damages should not have been assessed once the
highway was operational and open to the public.
The North Carolina Court of appeals interpreted the contract to allow liquidated damages
to run until final inspection, not just substantial completion, and therefore ruled in favor of the
Department.
3.2 Case two
U.S. for the Use and Benefit of Control Systems, Inc. v. The Arundel Corp.
814 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1987)
The Army Corps of Engineers awarded a contract to a joint venture headed by the
Arundel Corp. to construct a lock in a canal. The electrical portion of the work included the
installation of a computerized control system of sensors and cameras. The contract required the
project to be "functionally operational" by January 18, 1982, and provided for liquidated
damages of $520 per day for late completion.
The installation of the control system ran behind schedule and the project was not
accepted until June 3, 1982. As a result, the Corps assessed liquidated damages of $70,720.
Arundel in return assessed the same amount against its electrical subcontractor.
The U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, ruled that the electrical subcontractor could not
be responsible for the late completion because the control system was not required in order for
the lock to be "functionally operational." It could be controlled with an additional operator.
Therefore, the completion of the control system had no relevance to the assessment of liquidated
damages against the prime contractor.
3.3 Case three
Appeal of Rivera Construction Co., Inc.
ASBCA No. 30207 (April 12, 1988)
The government awarded a contract to Rivera Construction Co., Inc. for office space
alteration. The contract called for liquidated damages amount of $85 per day for late
completion. The contractor completed the project late and was assessed liquidated damages. A
dispute ensued as to whether the liquidated damages ceased when the government took
occupancy of the office space or when the contractor completed the punch list items.
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals said that liquidated damages compensate
an Owner for loss of use of a project. Therefore, they must cease when the project is
substantially complete, and the Owner takes beneficial occupancy of the project, not when the
contractor completes the punch list work.
The Board ruled in favor of the contractor citing that "beneficial occupancy usually
occurs when the government occupies or uses a facility before its final acceptance for the
purpose for which it was intended, provided it was satisfactorily completed to that extent. The
space was essentially complete and ready for its intended use on 3 February, even if the
incomplete status of some features may have caused some inconvenience in its use."
3.4 Case four
Appeal of Mitchell Engineering & Construction Co., Inc.
ENG BCA No. 3785 (April 4, 1989)
The Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals ruled that although a contractor may
be defaulted for failure to complete punch list work, liquidated damages pertain only to loss of
use of the facility, and therefore must cease when the project is available for its intended
purpose.
The government awarded a contract to Mitchell Engineering and Construction Co., Inc.
to build an oil and paint storage facility. The contract called for liquidated damages of $85 per
day for late completion.
The contractor performed work behind schedule, and by August 29 work was
substantially complete and the government prepared a punch list of the remaining work. The list
included a leak in the roof and a heater to be installed.
The roof was repaired on September 9 and the heater was installed on October 3. The
government accepted the project on November 11. A dispute ensued as to until which date the
liquidated damages should be assessed.
The Board concluded that the building was not available before September 9, as the roof
leak prevented storage of materials. The heater was not necessary for the use of the building,
however, as the heating season had not arrived. Liquidated damages therefore could not be
assessed after roof repair of September 9.
3.5 Case five
Stone Heavy Equipment Company v. City ofArcola
536 N.E.2d 1329 (Il App. 1989)
The City of Arcola, Illinois, awarded a contract to Stone Heavy Equipment Company to
construct a sewer facility. The contract allowed 365 calendar days to complete the work and
called for liquidated damages of $200 per day for late construction.
The contractor finished work behind schedule. By October 10, 1983, the contract work
was substantially complete and the plant was operational. However, the City assessed liquidated
damages until the following spring when the facility was accepted.
A dispute ensued as to whether the liquidated damages ceased when the government took
occupancy of the office space or when the contractor completed the punch list.
The contractor then challenged both the enforceability of the liquidated damages provision and
the period of time for which it was assessed.
The City estimated the $200 per day rate based on the anticipated extended service of the
resident engineer. At the time of the contract formation, the City estimated such cost to be
higher, but tried to keep liquidated damages amount low to encourage more competitive bids.
The Appellate Court of Illinois found the City practice in estimating liquidated damages
amount reasonable, and therefore the provision enforceable. However, the Court ruling,
regarding the period of time liquidated damages could be assessed, was that the City had to stop
assessing liquidated damages once the contractor achieved substantial completion of the project.
The Court cited that "the trial court found substantial completion on October 10, 1983. Since the
project was sufficiently complete at that time to be used for the purpose for which it was
intended, then it would seem appropriate to construe the liquidated damages provision to close at
the time of substantial completion, even though there may be minor repairs, adjustment, or
finishing work remaining."
3.6 Case six
J. M. Beeson Company v. Sartori
553 So.2d 180 (Fla. App. 1989)
Ernesto Sartori awarded a contract to J.M. Beeson Company to construct a shopping
center. The contract called for liquidated damages of $1,000 per day if the contractor failed to
substantially complete the work within 300 days from Notice to Proceed. The contract also
called for a bonus of $1,000 per day if the project was completed ahead of schedule.
With about $69,000 worth of work remaining, a dispute developed regarding substantial
completion date and liquidated damages. In the resulting litigation, the District Court of Appeal
of Florida ruled that the project is substantially complete, when the Owner is able to use the
facility for its intended purpose. The cost of the remaining work is irrelevant to this
determination.
The court stated that the shopping center project was substantially complete when the
space became available for occupancy and fixturing by tenants. And, liquidated damages shall
cease to run at this point.
4. Other Court Decisions
The following examples provide other legal decisions and precedence regarding liquidated
damages.
4.1 Case one
Liquidated Damages assessment does not cease with contractor abandonment
City of Boston v. Newv England Sales & Manufacturing Corp.
438 N.E.2d 68 (Mass. 1982)
New England Sales and Manufacturing Corporation was awarded a contract for the
removal and replacement of traffic controls cables. The contract called for liquidated damages
of $40 per day for late completion. The contractor performed behind schedule and eventually
abandoned the incomplete site, twenty-six days after the contractual completion date.
Five months after the abandonment, the Owner awarded the contract to a second
contractor to finish it. The primary issue in the resulting litigation was the correct computation
of liquidated damages. The Owner argued that liquidated damages should be assessed until the
second contractor actually finished the project. The contractor argued, and a trial court agreed,
that liquidated damages apply only to delay, not abandoned performance, so the damages are not
payable after the date of abandonment.
The Owner appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which ruled that
liquidated damages might be recovered beyond the date of the contractor abandonment and until
the date a substitute contractor could reasonably complete the project. The court stated that "the
appropriate rule is to allow recovery of reasonable liquidated damages beyond the date the
defaulting party abandons the work. A contrary rule would permit a party to limit its liability for
liquidated damages by abandoning the work and would deny the injured party those damages
which were agreed to."
The Court also noted that "the period of delay for which liquidated damages may be
recovered must be limited to the period of reasonable delay. The injured party must act with
reasonable promptness to complete the work. Unreasonable delays by any successor contractor
should not be charged against the party who abandoned the work."
4.2 Case two
Unilateral changes to Liquidated damages amount deems makes the clause unenforceable
Appeal of Jacqueline Howell, Ltd
ASBCA No. 27026 (September 30, 1982)
The liquidated damages clause was omitted from the contract. After the contract award,
the government amended it to add a liquidated damages clause for an amount of $23 per day.
The Armed Services Board of Contract appeals ruled that although many procurement
regulations have the effect of law, even when not included in the contract, the government may
not unilaterally impose a liquidated damages provision which was inadvertently omitted from the
contract documents.
The Board concluded that even if the Defense Acquisition Regulations, which contains
liquidated damages provision, could be read into the contract, there was no prior agreement as to
the amount of liquidated damages. Therefore, the unilateral imposition of liquidated damages is
unenforceable.
4.3 Case three
Appeal of Coliseum Construction, Inc
ASBCA No. 36642 (December 6, 1988)
In a similar decision to that in case 4.2, liquidated damages provision was ruled
unenforceable as its amount was unilaterally changed in the contract documents by the Owner.
The government awarded a contract to Coliseum Construction, Inc. to build the
foundations for a radar tower. The contract called for a liquidated damages amount of $1,820
per day for late completion. However, the Owner's contracting officer reduced the liquidated
damages to $220 per day after realizing that the initial rate was too high.
The contractor finished work 98 days behind schedule and was assessed liquidated
damages which he challenged its enforceability.
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals ruled that by reducing the daily rate, the
Owner acknowledged that the original amount was unreasonably high and did not reflect a good
faith effort by the government to predict the actual damages. Therefore, the Board concluded
that, the Government lost the right to assess any liquidated damages against the contractor.
4.4 Case four
Liquidated damages enforceable regardless of the absence of actual damages
Appeal of Preston - Brady Co., Inc.
VABCA No. 1892 (March 3, 1987)
The government awarded a contract for a hospital renovation. The contract had duration
of 270 days, and called for liquidated damages of $260 per day.
The contractor finished behind schedule and was assessed liquidated damages for 22 days
of delay. The contractor challenged the liquidated damages enforceability, noting that the
government did not even occupy the hospital until five months after final acceptance. The
contractor used that as evidence that the government did not suffer any actual damages from the
delay, and that the liquidated damages clause was used as a penalty
The Veterans Administration Board of Contract Appeals ruled that if the liquidated
damages amount is a reasonable estimate of the actual damages at the time of the contract
formation, it is enforceable whether or not the government suffers actual damages
4.5 Case five
Evidence that time was not of the essence to the Owner deemed liquidated damages
unenforceable
Appeal of Sunflower Landscaping & Garden Center
AGBCA No. 87-342-1 (July 16, 1991)
The Soil Conservation Service awarded a contract to Sunflower Landscaping & Garden
Center for a drainage system improvement project, which was to be substantially complete in
264 days. The contract provided for liquidated damages of $148 per day for late completion.
The contractor performed behind schedule and eventually was terminated for default,
with 130 days remaining in the contract. The contractor was assessed liquidated damages as well
as reprocurement costs. The contractor challenged the enforceability of the liquidated damages
provision.
The substitute contractor completed the remaining work in 14 days. The Department of
Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals used that as evidence that the Owner was not really
concerned about the time (and consequently about late completion) when it provided for 264
days for completion of work that evidently required much less time. Therefore, liquidated
damages amount was inserted as a penalty not as a reasonable forecast of anticipated actual
damages. The Board ruled that the liquidated damages provision was not enforceable.
4.6 Case six
Liquidated damages should be limited to delay caused by the contractor
Mattingly Bridge Co., Inc. v. Holloway & Son Construction Co.
694 S. W. 2d 702 (Ky. 1985)
If more than one party is responsible for the delay, liquidated damages should be assessed
only to the delay caused by the contractor, provided that the delay could be assigned to each
party.
The government awarded a contract to Holloway and Son Construction Co. as a prime
contractor to build a state highway. The Contractor then hired Mattiney Bridge Co., Inc. as its
subcontractor for the concrete structures.
The subcontract called for liquidated damages of $750 per day, which was the same
amount, contained in the prime contract. The subcontract allowed for a completion date 15 days
before the prime contract completion date.
The contractor completed the project seven months behind schedule for a variety of
reasons, including delay by the subcontractor. The prime contractor assessed liquidated damages
against its subcontractor for 193 days.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled that the subcontractor is liable only for the number
of days of delay it actually caused to the prime contractor. The Court found that to be 32 days,
and therefore the subcontractor can be held liable only for 32 days of liquidated damages.
4.7 Case seven
Release of retainage and final payment does not waive Owner's right to liquidated damages
Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Gust K. Newberg, Inc.
531 N.E.2d 982 (IlL App. 1988)
The Illinois State Toll Highway Authority awarded a contract to the joint venture of
Newberg-Kurg-Brighton to construct a highway. The contract stipulated liquidated damages for
late completion. The contractor finished work behind schedule. The Owner released retainage
and final payment and later filed a claim for liquidated damages.
The contractor challenged the claim arguing that the Owner waived its right to assess
liquidated damages by making final payment.
The Appellate Court of Illinois stated that nothing contained in the contract limited the
Owner's right to recover delay damages and ruled in favor of the Owner.
C. Examples
1. Clauses from the CA/T project
.1 A construction contract
The following is a liquidated damages clause for a construction contract on the CA/T
project. Each liquidated damages amount is estimated independently and then assigned to each
corresponding contract milestone. Final Acceptance is usually assigned a liquidated damages
amount of zero, since the contract is considered functionally operational at substantial
completion.
"The contractor shall complete the work within the contract time, and
to achieve the contract milestone(s) specified in the contract division I Special
Provision, and both parties recognize that these contract times and contract
milestones are of the essence to this contract.
If the contractor fails to complete the work required to achieve a contract
milestone or complete the work within the contract time, as specified in the
contract documents, or as adjusted by change order(s), the contractor shall pay
to the Department, not as a penalty, but as liquidated damages, the amounts
set forth for each calendar day of delay stated in the contract Division I
Special Provision for this Subsection.
Liquidated Damages
Milestone #1 (Final Acceptance) $0 per Calendar Day
Milestone #2 (Substantial Completion) $13,200 per Calendar Day
Milestone #3 $4,500 per Calendar Day
Milestone #4 $15,200 per Calendar Day
Milestone #5 $12,500 per Calendar Day
The assessments against the contractor for liquidated damages may be
cumulative and additive to each other.
In the event that the work has been physically completed, but there remains to
be submitted to the Department by the contractor any reports or other
documents in accordance with the requirements of the contract documents, the
work shall not be considered satisfactory completed within the meaning of
MGL Chapter 30, Section 39G, until the receipt of such reports or documents
by the Engineer.
Whatever sum of money may become due and payable to the Department by
the contractor under this subsection may be retained out of payments yet to be
made to the contractor by the department. The requirements of this subsection
shall not be construed or treated by the parties to the contract as imposing a
penalty upon the contractor for failing to complete the work within the
contract time(s) or contract milestones(s), but as liquidated damages to
compensate the Department for additional costs incurred by the Department
because of the failure of the contractor fully to complete the work within the
contract time(s) and contract milestone(s).
If the Department permits the contractor to continue and finish the work or
any part thereof, after the date fixed for the completion of the work, it shall
not operate as a waiver by the Department of any of its rights."
1.2 A design contract
The following is a clause from a design contract on the CA/T. There is no liquidated
damages clause, and therefore in case of a delay, the Department needs to prove consequential
actual damages.
"The Consultant shall commence its services upon receipt of the Department's
written Notice to Proceed, prosecute said services diligently, and complete the
services to meet the contract milestones set forth in Attachment C to this
contract. Failure by Consultant to meet these schedule requirements that is
not excusable under Section A-8, Subsection 2.0 "Excusable Delays" of this
contract, could result in withholding of payments or termination of this
contract pursuant to Attachment A-4, "Termination."
2. Clauses from other projects
2.1 Project one
The following clause is from a multiple prime contract project to build a 3,400 square
foot addition to a student center for a college. The project involves separate contracts for
General Construction, Electric, HVAC, Structural Steel, and Plumbing. However, only one
liquidated damages clause was used for the five contracts. Also, as the following clause
indicates, the Owner stated that liquidated damages are in addition to consequential actual
damages.
"In the event of the failure of the Contractor to complete the said work within
the time stated in his proposal, the contractor shall be liable to the College in
the sum of one thousand ($1, 000) dollars per day, or the sum equal to 1/2 0th
of one percent of the total consideration providedfor under his contract per
day, or that sum mentioned in the contract, whichever is greater, for each and
every day that said work shall be and remain uncompleted. This sum shall be
treated as liquidated damages and not a penalty, for the loss to the College of
use of premises in a completed state of construction, alteration or repair, as
the case may be, andfor added administrative and inspection costs to the
College on account of the delay; provided, however, that the liquidated
damages provided for herein shall be in addition to other consequential losses
or damages that the College may incur by reason of such delay, such as, but
not limited to added costs of the project and the cost offurnishing temporary
services, if any. Any such items for which the Contractor is liable may be
deducted by the College from any monies due or to become due to the
Contractor.
It is hereby understood and mutually agreed by and between the Contractor
and the College that the date of the beginning the dates of required
intermediate milestones, and the time for completion, as specified in the
contract of the work to be done hereunder are essential conditions of this
contract.
The Contractor agrees that said work shall be prosecuted regularly,
diligently, and uninterruptedly at such rate ofprogress as will insure full
completion thereof within the time specified. It is expressly understood and
agreed, by and between the Contractor and the College that the time for the
completion the work herein is a reasonable time for the completion of the
same, taking into consideration the average climatic range and usual
industrial conditions prevailing in this locality. "
2.2 Project two
In this project the Owner used a unit rate-based liquidated damages, instead of per diem rate.
The scope of work is to upgrade a wastewater treatment plant. The Owner specified liquidated
damages amount to be an amount per day for each million gallons that the Owner had to bypass
the facility under construction and treat the diverted wastewater at other plants. The actual
provision states:
"The contractor further agrees to allow the Owner to deduct from progress
payments and retention (or securities in lieu of retention) and to pay to the
Owner as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, the amount of- (a) Ten
Thousand Dollars and No/Cents ($10, 000) for each day that expires after the
contract time specified in this attachment for the completion of the designated
parts of the work, until that part is complete, and (b) Two Hundred and sixty-
three Dollars and No/Cents ($263) per day for each MGD that the Owner
must bypass the 23rd Avenue Wastewater Treatment Plant and treat at other
plants. "
2.3 Project three
This project is a turnkey project in the Middle East. The scope of work includes design,
engineering, procurement, construction, and initial operation of LNG upstream facilities.
As presented throughout this project's liquidated damages provision, the Owner explicitly used
the word penalty to describe the liquidated damages amount.
"Milestone completion and payment:
The Owner shall pay contractor for completion of the work of each milestone.
Each milestone represents afixed percentage of the total price for project
management, engineering, construction, commissioning, and initial operation.
The percentage allocated to each milestone shall be in accordance to contract
documents. Upon successful completion of a milestone, the contractor shall
submit all required information and documents for issuance of completion
certificate.
Penalty milestones shall be applicable as defined in table (II - 1). The
penalties defined in table (II - 1) shall become due if the associated milestone
has not been completed by the respective schedule completion date as defined
in the contract documents. The daily penalties, as a percentage of the total
contract price, shall be due for each calendar day following the scheduled
completion date until either, the associated milestone has been completed, or
the maximum percentage has been reached. Such penalty shall be deducted
from the nextpayment requisition submitted by the contractor. "
Table (1- 1)
Penalty Associated Description Penalty per Max. Value
Milestone Milestone Calendar Day of Penalty
Number (% of Contract (% of
Price) Contract
Price)
1 3 Completion of 0.1 2
Mobilization and
Commencement
of construction.
2 4 Procurement and 0.1 2
on site delivery
of wellhead
power and
communication
cables.
3 5 Preparation of 0.1 2
site to allow
construction start
by pipelines and
flow lines
contractor.
4 13 Substantial 0.15 10
Completion
It is worth noting that the Owner of this project used the payment mechanism to motivate
the contractor to meet the contract's milestones. Each milestone is assigned a percentage of the
contract total price. In this case the contractor is implicitly rewarded for performance - the faster
the contractor complete a milestone, the faster it gets paid. The contractor is also punished for
lack of performance - if the contractor fails to achieve a milestone on this contract, in addition to
withholding liquidated damages amount, the Owner also disapproves payment requisitions until
the milestone tied to these payment requisitions is completed.
2. 4 Project four
The following is the liquidated damages clause included in the European Community General
Conditions (FIDIC). The liquidated damages amount is stated in the Appendix to Tender of the
contract in question. Such amount is usually presented as a percentage of the total contract price.
The following is the liquidated damages for delay clause:
"If the Contractor fails to comply with the time for completion in accordance
with contract documents for the whole of the works or, if applicable, any
section within the relevant time prescribed by the contract documents, then
the Contractor shall pay to the Employer the relevant sum stated in the
Appendix to Tender as liquidated damages for such default and not as a
penalty (which sum shall be the only monies due from the Contractor for such
default) for every day or part of a day which shall elapse between the relevant
time of completion and the date stated in a taking-over certificate of the whole
of the work or the relevant section, subject to the applicable limit stated in the
Appendix to Tender. The Employer may, without prejudice to any other
method of recovery, deduct the amount of such damages from any monies due
or to become due to the contractor. The payment or deduction of such
damages shall not relieve the Contractor from his obligation to complete the
works, or from any other of his obligations and liabilities under the contract.
If before the time for completion of the whole works or, if applicable, any
section, a taking-over certificate has been issuedfor any part of the works or
of a section, the liquidated damages for delay in completion of the remainder
of the works or of that section shall, for any period of delay after the date
stated in such taking-over certificate, and in the absence of alternative
provisions in the contract, be reduced in the proportion which the value of this
part so certified bears to the value of the whole of the works or section, as
applicable. The provisions of this clause shall only apply to the rate of
liquidated damages and shall not affect the limit thereof "
2.5 Project five
This is a clause from a Build Operate and Transfer (B.O.T.) project in Europe. The scope of
work includes the design, construction, and provision of financing services for two Motorway
sections to a major city in Eastern Europe. The clause is from a draft proposal, which indicates
that the final liquidated damages amount is to be negotiated before signing the contract.
"The Contractor agrees to ensure completion of each section of the work by
the respective date indicated below:
Section I to be agreed
Section II to be agreed
Liquidated damages shall be payable by the contractor in the following
amounts for late completion of the work
Section I: $(to be negotiated)for each day of completion to a maximum of
2.5% of the portion of the contract price applicable to this section.
Section II: $(to be negotiated)for each day of completion to a maximum of
2.5% of the portion of the contract price applicable to this section.
The above liquidated damages for late completion shall be exclusive remedies
to Employer for delay in completion. "
2.6 Project six
This is an example of a B.O.O.T concession project in North Africa. The scope of this
Concession is to design, finance, develop and operate a new port and as an option to finance,
develop and operate a free zone.
The total duration of the Concession is fifty years.
The design and construction of the Port shall be completed in three years and six months from
the date of signing the Concession.
The following is the liquidated damages clause from the bidding documents of the Concession.
"Detailed Design and Construction Phases:
In the following cases, the Concessionaire shall incur the following penalties,
without prejudice to the provisions of clause 28 - Termination of the
Concession.
In case the prescribed duration of the detailed design phase is exceeded, the
concessionaire shall pay a penalty of DH 50, 000 per calendar day of delay.
In case the prescribed duration of the construction phase is exceeded, the
concessionaire shall pay a penalty of DH 100, 000 per calendar day of delay.
The Operation Phase:
If within the prescribed period, the Concessionaire does not send the
Conceding Authority the documents required by the Concession, and if a
formal request has remained unanswered for a period of thirty days, the
Concessionaire shall pay the Conceding Authority a penalty of DH 50, 000 per
document it has not sent.
If the guarantees for the number of containers handled at the Port are not
achieved, the Concessionaire shall pay DH 45 per container of the shortfall
as a penalty.
The penalties incurred under this clause are capped at 5% of the global cost
(excluding taxes) of the design and construction as set out in the financial
plan
Penalties become payable without a prior formal request.
The Conceding Authority may suspend the penalties provided in this clause
while waiting for start up operation. If such start up operation occurs on the
contractual date, the Conceding Authority shall notify the Concessionaire
whether it decides to waive such penalties. "
III. Estimating Liquidated Damages on the CA/T
A. Introduction
The CA/T Management Consultant established procedures as well as a model for
estimating liquidated damages. The procedures are adhered to for all construction contracts that
are to be bid on the CA/T. This chapter describes the procedures followed for the estimation and
documentation of liquidated damage amounts for construction contracts on the Central
Artery/Tunnel Project. The estimating model for calculating liquidated damage amounts will
also be illustrated and a case study will be presented to explain the model application on one of
the CA/T contracts.
B. The CA/T project procedures to calculate and document liquidated damages
1. Purpose
The purpose of the procedure is to outline the process and to establish instructions and guidelines
to assure that liquidated damage amounts do not represent (and can not be construed as) a
penalty, but rather a genuine estimate of the damages which MHD may incur as a result of
failure of the contractor to complete contract milestone(s) on time.
2. Definitions
Subject contract:
The contract for which liquidated damages are to be calculated and included in its bid
documents.
Follow on Contract:
The contract, which partially or totally depends on the subject contract and subsequently,
can be adversely impacted if the interfering portion of the subject contract extends beyond its
contractual dates.
Figure (III- 1) shows three cases of interfaces between a subject contract and a follow on
contract. In the first chart, the whole impacted contract can not start until the subject contract is
fully complete - the two contracts are done sequentially. In the second chart, the whole impacted
contract is dependent only on the completion of a portion of the subject contract. In the third
chart, while the two contracts are done concurrently, a portion of the impacted contract can not
start until a preceding portion of the subject contract is complete.
Figure (III -1)
Milestone:
A contractual date in the subject contract bid documents stipulating when the subject
contract completes certain construction activities before a follow-on access restraint can start.
Access restraint:
A contractual date in the impacted contract bid documents stipulating when the subject
contractor completes a milestone activity and turns over an area or a completed segment to the
follow-on contractor.
Work papers:
The documentation of basis of all calculations, assumptions, and reference documents
used to estimate liquidated damages.
Liquidated damages estimate package:
Includes work papers, summary sheet of subject contract milestone(s) with recommended
liquidated damage amounts, and cover sheet for signature approval.
Subject Contract
Follow on Contract
Subject Contract
Follow on Contract
Subject Contract
0
Follow on Contract
00
3. Examples of Milestone clauses from CA/T contracts
A typical milestone clause in a CA/T project will specify completion of certain
construction activities in number of days after Notice to Proceed as in the following clause:
"The contractor shall complete all structural work for the Central Artery tunnel box including
SPTC walls, cast in place concrete walls, roof structure and base slab for turnover to follow on
mechanical, electrical, IPCS, and tunnel finishes contract no later than one thousand eight
hundred twenty one (1,281) calendar days after Notice to Proceed.
In some cases, milestones also specify work hours instead of calendar days as indicated
in the following clause:
"The contractor shall complete all underpinning load transfer work and
remove all traffic diversion equipment from the Elevated Artery by 9:00 A.M.
Sunday morning of the weekend on which night time lane restrictions take
place.
4. Access Restraint clause examples from CA/T contracts
A typical access restraint clause will restrict certain work to start until a number of
calendar days from Notice to Proceed elapses as in the following clause:
"The contractor shall not begin work in construction phase 2A1 as
defined by activity descriptions for each work zone in the Traffic
Management Plans until one hundred sixty seven (167) calendar days after
Notice to Proceed.
An access restraint could also restricts work in certain hours as was the case with
Milestones:
"The contractor shall not begin installing traffic management diversion
equipment on the Elevated Artery, as required to initiate underpinning load
transfer work, until 10:00 P.M. Saturday evening of the weekend on which
night time lane restrictions take place."
Access restraints can also identify logic within the same contract as states the following
clause:
"The contractor shall not begin tunnel excavation on either the north or east sides of
the State Street block building until the facade of that building has been tied back in
accordance with the contract documents."
5. Calculation procedures
As mentioned earlier, the procedures are adhered to for all CA/T construction contracts,
and as figure (III - 2) depicts, the process is initiated by the procurement specialist request to the
project controls manager for liquidated damage amounts to be included in the subject contract
bid documents before advertisement for bids. The project controls manager forwards the request
to the estimating department manager who assigns a cost estimator to the subject contract. The
cost estimator gathers all pertinent information for the subject contract as well as the impacted
contract(s). Such information includes milestones dates, staffing requirement, cost estimates,
and construction duration. Contract milestone dates and duration are provided by the area
cost/schedule engineer who also provides schedule analysis for the interface(s) between the
subject contract and the impacted contract(s), identifying the portions of the impacted contracts
which can be delayed should the subject contract fail to meet the required date of the milestone
interfering with the impacted contract. Using all gathered information, the cost estimator studies
all interfaces, and the impact of the subject contract milestones delay on the follow-on
contract(s). He/she then applies the gathered data to the project model to estimate liquidated
damages amount for each milestone of the subject contract. The cost estimator assembles the
liquidated damages estimate package and forward it to the estimating supervisor for approval
process.
6. The approval process
After the estimating supervisor reviews the liquidated damages estimate package, and if
he/she concurs, he/she sends it to the Area Construction Manager for review and approval. If
revisions are required, the cost estimator incorporates them and the package is reviewed again by
the estimating supervisor, before it is sent to the Area Construction Manager.
After the Area Construction Manager reviews the package, and if in concurrence, he
returns the approved package to estimating supervisor. If revisions are required, the package is
sent to the Area Cost/Schedule Engineer, who work through the revisions with the Cost
estimator, before returning the modified package to the Area Construction Manager for approval.
The approved package is then sent back to the estimating supervisor, who forwards it to
the Project Controls Manager. If in concurrence, the Project Controls Manager approves and
returns the package to the Cost Estimator for distribution. Otherwise, he returns it to the Cost
Estimator to modify before approving it.
The approved package is then sent to the procurement specialist to incorporate in the
contract documents. A copy is filed in estimating files, a copy in procurement, and a copy is sent
to Area Construction Manager for filing.
Figure III- 2), Flow Chart for Calculation, Documentation and Approval of Liquidated Damages for Construction Contracts
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C. The Calculation Model
1. Introduction
If the contractor of the subject contract fails to achieve a milestone, there is usually an
impact to the follow-on contract. The impact is generally a delay to all or part of the follow-on.
As a result, the follow-on may be extended and incur the additional costs associated with time
extension, or if the follow-on is on the project critical path and time extension is not allowed, the
contractor will be forced to add more resources and/or to work overtime and extra shifts to
recover the lost time and subsequently will incur additional costs. In some cases, achieving the
milestone in question is on the critical path for a project wide milestone, and as such the
milestone is not allowed to be delayed. The only option then is to recover the expected delay in
the subject contract by adding more resources and by working extended hours. This is defined as
self-acceleration. In any event, there will be additional costs, which can be passed on to MHD if
there is no mechanism in place to recover these additional costs. Liquidated Damages clauses
ensure that MHD will recover these costs.
The purpose of the CA/T model is to calculate the additional costs for all cases, then an
amount, which is appropriate to the situation in hand, will be incorporated into the liquidated
damages clause. The CA/T model consists of three separate models, delay, disruption, and
acceleration. It is important to note that the project, for simplicity, treats these three cases as if
they are mutually exclusive.
2. The Disruption Model
Disruption as defined in the CA/T model occurs when a delay forces the contractor to
accomplish the same amount of work in a shorter time frame, and usually with higher costs than
estimated in the contractor's bid price for same work.
The disruption model estimates the additional costs the contractor may suffer above the
bid price of the impacted work. The disruption model assumes that the contractor will recover
the time of delay by adding more resources and by doing work in an out-of-sequence manner. It
also assumes that the contractor bid estimate is based on an optimal allocation of resources as
well as optimum crew sizes for each construction activity, given its nature, quantity, site
condition, market conditions, space, contract milestone and access restraint dates, etc.
An optimum crew size is the minimum number of workers required to perform a
construction activity within the scheduled duration to meet contractual milestones. Optimum
crew size shall have an acceptable production rate to support schedule and to achieve milestones
while maintaining the lowest possible labor costs that are incorporated in the bid amount. Any
decrease to crew size shall jeopardize schedule, and any increase to the crew size above the
optimum level can result in a higher production rate, but at a higher unit cost, since each new
worker will increase crew productivity as well as labor unit cost.
The model calculates disruption damages according to the following equation:
Disruption damage = disruption inefficiency factor x value of impacted work
The inefficiency factor used in the CA/T disruption model is adapted from a model
developed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Modification Impact Evaluation Guide.
However, the Corps definition of this model is acceleration by increasing crew size.
Table (III-1) shows the loss in production (the inefficiency factor) as a function of
percent increase in resources (crew size) above its optimum level. This table is derived from the
Composite Effect of Crew Overloading chart included in the "Modification Impact Evaluation
Guide EP 415-1-3", which is published by The Department of the Army, Office of the Chief
Engineers, July 1979.
Table (III -1)
Percent of Additional Percent of Inefficiency
Resources
0.1 0.1
2.5 0.5
5.0 1.0
7.5 1.5
10 2.0
12.5 2.5
15.0 3.0
17.5 3.5
20.0 4.0
22.5 4.5
25.0 5.0
27.5 5.5
30.0 6.0
32.5 6.4
35.0 6.9
37.5 7.4
40.0 7.8
42.5 8.3
45.0 8.9
47.5 9.5
50.0 10.0
52.5 10.6
55.0 11.2
57.5 11.8
60.0 12.5
62.5 13.0
65.0 13.5
67.5 14.0
70.0 14.5
72.5 15.0
75.0 15.5
77.5 16.0
80.0 16.5
82.5 17.0
85.0 17.5
87.5 18.0
90.0 18.5
92.5 19.2
95.0 20.0
97.5 20.5
100.0 21.0
Equation (III-1) calculates the percent increase in crew size as a function of the required
reduction in the construction duration and the original duration of the impacted work.
Equation (HI - 1)
Percent increase in resources = Delay in Construction Duration / (Original Duration - Delay)
The above equation is derived mathematically by assuming a uniform distribution of resources
over the activity duration, therefore that the crew day for the activity before and after the delay
remains constant.
Table (III-1) and equation (III- 1) streamline the process of calculating the disruption
inefficiency factor, as the case study will show later in this chapter.
3. Overrun Probability
Both inefficiency factor, in the disruption model, as well as the cost factor, in the acceleration
model, discussed later in this chapter, vary depending on the overrun amount as a percentage of
the time planned to construct the impacted work. The amount of overrun can not be estimated
before hand, and for the purpose of estimating the liquidated amount, an overrun probability
table has been driven. Three probability distribution curves have been studied in developing this
table. Initial distribution, normal distribution, and beta distribution were analyzed The classic
normal distribution used a standard deviation of 10% - 95% of all projects will complete within
80% of the estimated duration. The initial distribution used an in-house assumption that 80% of
all contract overruns will be less than 10% of the forecasted duration. The beta distribution was
based on statistical analysis of in-house historical data. The probability curve used in the
calculation model is created by averaging the probabilities of the initial and normal distributions.
The final overrun probability values are presented in table (III - 2).
Table (HI - 2)
Range of Overrun Probability
0.0% 2.5% 0.12
2.5% 5.0% 0.12
5.0% 7.5% 0.33
7.5% 10.0% 0.17
10 0% 15.0% 0.13
15.0% 20.0% 0.09
20.0% 25.0% 0.03
25.0% & above 0.01
4. The Acceleration Model
Acceleration as defined in the CA/T model occurs when a delay requires the contractor to
increase shift length, increase workdays per week, or work multiple shifts. Acceleration is
similar to disruption in its purpose of accomplishing the same amount of work at a shorter period
of time. However, acceleration differs from disruption model in assuming that the recovery of
delay is achieved by using overtime. The model calculates the expected increase in costs to the
contractor associated with crashing the construction schedule of the impacted work. The
increase in cost results from the inefficiency from working abnormal hours, and the premium
paid to labor for working overtime or different shifts. The normal workweek is 40 hours, eight
hours per day, five days (Monday - Friday) per week. Working more hours per week introduces
premium pay rates and inefficiency loss. The acceleration model uses the following equation to
calculate the acceleration damages:
Acceleration damages = (Inefficiency factor x cost factor - 1) x value of the impacted
work
5. Inefficiency factor
Table (III - 3) is used by the CA/T to determine the inefficiency factor for the
acceleration damages calculation. The table is driven from interpolating and fitting curve using
data from various studies by the Army Corps of Engineers, and papers presented in the ASCE
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management.
Normal acceleration is when the number of days to be recovered is less than 25% of the
original schedule of the impacted work. Extreme acceleration is when the recovery is more than
25%. The inefficiency factor is a function of the number of days of working overtime and the
nature of the acceleration (normal or severe).
Table (III- 3)
Number of days to be Inefficiency Factor Inefficiency Factor
recovered Normal Acceleration Severe Acceleration
0-1 1 1
1-10 1.05 1.1
11-30 1.1 1.2
31-50 1.2 1.3
51-70 1.3 1.45
71-&above 1.4 1.5
6. Cost Factor
For normal acceleration, up to ten hours of overtime per week, labor is usually paid 1.5
the regular pay rate for the first ten hours of overtime. This is a total of five hours paid as
premium, or 10% of the 50 hours actually worked during the week.
For sever acceleration, more than 10 hours per week, say average 20 hours, the first 10
hours are paid five hours premium, and the second 10 hours are paid 10 hours premium. This is
a total of 15 hours premium, or 25% of the 60 hours worked in the week. Table (III - 4)
summarizes the cost factor calculations.
Table (III - 4)
Acceleration Cost factor
Normal 1.1
Severe 1.25
7. The Delay Model
The delay model estimates the cost associated with time extension of the follow on
contract due to delay by the subject contract. There are four components of the delay model
additional costs: time dependent job site overhead costs, home office overhead costs, escalation
costs, markups.
8. Job site Overhead Costs
Time dependent job site overheads are defined as the contractor time dependent general
conditions which can not be allocated to specific tangible pay item work but rather to the whole
field or to a group of items. Examples are field supervision, temporary utilities, temporary
facilities, hoisting equipment, pick up trucks, site weekly clean up, and maintenance of
temporary roads.
Table (III -5) summarizes the time-dependent job site overhead per diem costs that are
used on the CA/T. The table was created after analyzing cost, schedule and contract data of
fourteen projects ranging from $1.4 million to $194 million.
Table HI- 5)
Size of Contract Time Dependent Job site Costs
$1 million to $2 Million $1,000 per day
$2 million to $5 Million $1,000 per day plus $500 per day per $1
million over $2 million
$5 million to $10 Million $800 to $1,200 per day per $5 million
$10 million to $100 Million $1,200 to $1,800 per day per $10 million
$100 million to $210 Million $800 to $1,200 per day per $10 million
9. Home Office Overhead Costs
The total home office overhead costs are assumed to be between 2 to 7% of the total
contract value for the general contractor; and about 10% for a subcontractor.
10. Escalation
The impacted contractor will also experience an escalation cost for each day of extension
above its contractual dates due to delays by the subject contract. The annual escalation rate is an
estimate that changes every year, based on projection of the trend of the ENR quarterly
construction price index. The model multiplies the escalation yearly rate by the whole contract
value and divide by 365 to calculate the daily cost.
11. Mark-ups
The mark-ups cost represents bonds, insurance, and profit and is currently assumed to be 10%.
The cost estimator however could use a different percentage as appropriate.
D. The CA/T Estimating Model
1. The Subject contract scope of work
The subject contract scope of work is the construction of the initial Leverett Circle
connectors (Ramp S-N connecting Storrow drive east bound to 1-93 North bound, and Ramp N-S
connecting 1-93 south bound traffic to Storrow drive west), from an interface with a bridge
adjacent to the Charles River, crossing the North Station Railyard, to an abutment adjacent to
Nashua street eastbound; the construction of transition structures south of the Nashua Street
abutment; the construction of Temporary Ramp LC-N carrying traffic from Leverett circle into
the existing 1-93 on-ramp; modifications to existing highway ramps and connections into existing
highway ramps; underpinning existing 1-93 on ramp foundations, demolition of about 400 feet of
the existing 1-93 on-ramp, and the construction of surface streets and utilities.
The scope of work also includes the following to be performed in the North Station
Railyard: construction of drilled shaft foundations for Ramps S-N and N-S; demolition and
reconstruction of platforms and associated utilities to construct foundations; utility and drainage
structures; and surface restoration to pre-construction conditions.
The work also includes construction staging and traffic management to ensure the
maintenance of vehicular traffic; staging of operations in the North Station Railyard to maintain
rail traffic; and mitigation to limit construction impacts to neighboring facilities.
The contractor shall also provide two interim power facilities for highway lighting and
construction activities. The two facilities will be also used by another CA/T contract C19D3.
2. The follow-on and interfacing contracts
During the contract time, there is expected to be up to six contractors performing work in the
area east of the MBTA rail area and between the Fleet Center, the existing 1-93 viaduct, and the
Charles River (figure (III - 3)):
C19D3 - Storrow Drive Bridge
C19DI - Mainline Bridge
C19E1 - Tunnels under North Station tracks
C19E4 - Ventilation Building
C19E5 - Storm Drain Outfall Structure
Just to the south, the mainline contract C15A2.
And west of Nashua Street abutment, and on Ramps N-S and S-N alignment, the
demolition of Minot Steam plant, R19E3.
Figure (M - 3)
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3. Milestones and access restraints
The contract documents included the milestones and access restraints shown in figure (III - 4)
Milestone #1
The contractor shall complete the entire work for Final Acceptance by the Department, in
accordance with contract documents, no later than seven hundred forty (740) days after Notice
To Proceed (NTP).
Milestone #2
The contractor shall complete the entire work for Substantial Completion in accordance
with contract documents, no later than six hundred seventy five (675) days after NTP.
Milestone #3
The contractor shall complete all work associated with and have operational the interim
Power Facilities, no later than two hundred forty (240) days after NTP
C19B8 C1981I
C19E1
C1 5A1/
Figure (III -4)
Early Early 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Start Finish
29AUG97 NTP
29AUG97 AR #3 Laydown Areas A,B,C,H
01SEP97 - - AR #2 Laydown Area G
01SEP97 AR #2 Laydown Area E
01SEP97 AR #2 Laydown Area F
01SEP97 AR #2 Laydown Area I
01SEP97 AR #2 Laydown Area D
280CT97 I AR #7 Right of Way Access 60 CD
07DFC.7 • AR #8 NHnt, NSN2, NH3, NHh. Ab, F24, L-CS SW 100
26JAN98 + AR #1 Minot Steam Plant 150 CD
25APR98 * MS #3 Complete Interim Power Facilities 240
25JUN98 • AR #4 C19D3 Completes Bent CRNSH1 300
25JUN98 • AR #A C1 9D3 Work Zone 300
21NOV98 • MS #4 Demo 1-93 on-ramp LC to F25 460
10JAN99 • MS #6 Complete piers, box girders H. Stn. 500
10JUN99 ) • AR #6 Ci9E1 Complete Tunnel Seg. Ramp S-H 650
04JUL99 + MS #2 Substantial Completion 675
07SEP99 MS #1 Final Acceptance 740
Milestone #4
The contractor shall demolish the existing Leverett Circle/I-93 on-ramp connector from
Leverett Circle to Bent F25, about 400 feet, no later than four hundred fifty (450) days after NTP
to allow the C19E1 contractor to construct a tunnel and boat section segment of Ramp S-N in
that area.
Milestone #5
The contractor shall finish all work in the North station Track area, completing all piers
and erection of box girders, no later than five hundred (500) days after NTP.
Access Restraint #1
The contractor will be restricted from access to the area of the Minot Steam Plant for a
period of one hundred and fifty (150) days after NTP
Access Restraint #2
The contractor shall
periods as follows:
have access to areas for lay down shown on figure (III -5) during the
Access Restraint #3
The contractor will have access to areas A, B, C, and H shown on figure (III - 5), during
the entire duration of construction.
Access Restraint #4
The contractor shall not construct the span from bents NS6/SN6, to bents CR/NS I and
CR/SN1, until the later are constructed by the adjacent contractor for C19D3. This is expected to
be approximately three hundred (300) days after NTP
Access Restraint #5
The contractor shall not have access to any area located within 30 feet of the C19D3
Bents CR/NS1 and CR/SN1 until three hundred (300) days after NTP, without prior approval of
the engineer, in order to allow the C19D3 contractor to complete construction of these bents.
Access Restraint #6
The contractor will be prohibited from constructing Temporary Lomasney Loop until the
adjacent contractor for C19E 1 has completed the tunnel of Ramp S-N in the area. This is
expected to be six hundred fifty (650) days after NTP.
Area Duration
D September 1997 - August 1999
E September 1997 - December 1998
F September 1997 - December 1998
G September 1997 - May 1998
I September 1997 - December 1998
Access Restraint #7
The contractor shall not have access to all right-of-way parcels until sixty (60) days after
NTP.
Access Restraint #8
For a period of one hundred (100) days after NTP, the contractor shall not proceed on any
work for viaducts Bents NS 1/SN1, NS2/SN2, SN3, the Nashua Street Abutment, F24
Underpinning, or the slurry walls without the approval of the engineer.
Figure (III-5)
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E. Estimating liquidated damages for the subject contract milestone #4
1. Introduction
As stated earlier, milestone #4 is critical to the follow-on contract C19E 1. It requires the
subject contractor to build a temporary ramp from Leverett Circle on top of the existing Storrow
drive westbound underpass and tie it to the existing 1-93 on-ramp. This will require
underpinning work of two bents of the existing on-ramp. After the temporary ramp is built and
open to traffic, the contractor then demolish the existing on ramp portion which has been
replaced by the new ramp. This work needs to be completed in 450 days after NTP. The
contractor then turns over the area to the follow-on contract C19E1, which will build a tunnel
segment for ramp S-N in this area. This work for both contracts is on the critical path for a
project wide milestone to open Leverett Circle, and therefore failure of the contractor to meet
this milestone will result in additional cost to the follow-on to recover the delay.
2. Assumptions and Contracts information
The liquidated damage amounts were calculated during bid documents formation with the
assumptions and data about the subject and follow-on contracts as detailed in table (II -6). The
data are from the contracts documents, schedules, and cost estimates as well as assumptions
made by the Cost/Schedule Analyst.
Table (III - 6)
Contract No. C19E7 Milestone: 04
Part 1: "Subject Contract" Info C19E7 Notes
Contract Title Ramp NS-SN Viaduct
Approx. Contract Value $53,539,800 May 31, 97 "All-In cost"
Projected Contract Duration 675 calendar days
Forecasted NTP 29-Aug-97
Days from NTP to Milestone 450 calendar days
Date of Milestone 22-Nov-98
Assumed Maximum Milestone Overrun (20% Overrun) 90 calendar days
% Non-Material Related Costs in Subject Contract 52.0%
Percent Complete 77.0%
Percent Duration 67.0%
Float with Follow-on Contract 0 calendar days
Do you want to compare self-acceleration cost? yes Yes or No
Assumed Acceleration Cost for "Subject" Contract $15,170 per day
Part 2: Primary Follow-on Contract Info C19EI
Contract Title 1-93 Leverett Cir/Storrow Dr Connectors
Approx. Contract Value $72,753,123 May 31, 97 "All-In cost"
Contract Start Date (Actual or projected) 05-May-98
Contract Completion Date (Actual or projected) 28-Nov-2002
Overall Contract Duration (calendar days) 1668
% Impacted 7.2%
Value of Impacted Work $5,272,600
Labor % of Impacted Work 27.0%
Equipment % of Impacted Work 10 0%
Overhead % of Impacted Work 21.0%
Value of Labor for Impacted Work $1,423,602
Value of Equip. for Impacted Work $527,260
Value of Overhead for Impacted Work $1,107,246
Early Start Date for Follow-on Contract 22-Nov-98 Access date
Follow-on Contract Required Completion Date 01-Jun-99 (Need-by date)
Days Available to Complete Work 191 calendar days
Expected Duration for Accelerated Work 115 calendar days
Are there secondary follow-on contracts to consider? no Yes or No
Part 3: Secondary Follow-on Contract Info
Method Used Quick Quick or Detailed
Quick Method (Escalation only)
Enter value of all secondary contracts:
Detailed Method (Use largest contract if more than one)
Contract Title
Approx. Contract Value $0 Apr 30, 97 "All-In cost"
Contract Start Date (Actual or projected) 01-Jan-99
Contract Completion Date (Actual or projected) 31-Oct-2003
Overall Contract Duration (calendar days) 1763 6
% Impacted NA
Value of Impacted Work
Part 4: Schedule Interaction Info (for Primary)
Can we delay follow-on contract? no Enter Yes or No
What is type of Overtime Acceleration? Normal Enter Normal or Severe
3. The Disruption Model
Table (HII -7)
Overrun Days Percent of Labor Disrupted Disrupted Over-head Total Cost Total Per Mark Up 
Grand
additional Inefficiency Labor Cost Equipment Day Total per
Low High Resources (%) Cost Day
C D E F G H I J K L 
M
0 11.2 10.89 2 S28,472 $28,697 $30,132 $87,301 $7,760 $1,707 $9,467
5
11.25 22.5 24.43 4.5 $64,062 $64,405 $67,625 $196,092 $8,715 $1,917 $10,632
22.5 33.7 41.74 7.8 $111,041 $110,050 $115,552 $336,643 $9,975 $2,195 $12,170
5
33.75 64.66 S185.068 $170,450 $178,973 $534,492 $11,878 $2,613 $14,491
45 675 143.31
67.5 90 365.85
90 112. 5357.14
5
112 5
Column C and column D converts the low and high overrun ranges in the first two columns of
table (III - 2) into days by multiplying each value by the milestone total duration from table (III -
6), (450 days).
Column E calculates the percent of increase in resources to recover delay by applying equation
(III-1), using the high range of delay from column D and the original duration to finish the
follow on work from table (III - 6) (115 days).
Column F contains values from table (III - 1) which correspond to values in column E.
Column G is the multiplication of the labor cost of the impacted contract ($1,423,602), which is
obtained from table (III - 6), times the labor inefficiency factors in column F.
Column H is the multiplication of the equipment cost of the impacted work ($527,260), from
table (III - 6), by the inefficiency factors in column F.
Column I calculates disruption costs for overhead by multiplying the value of overhead work for
the follow on (1,107,246), from table (III - 6), by an estimated inefficiency factor of 0.25 of the
corresponding percent additional resources in column F.
Column J adds disruption costs for labor (column G), equipment (column H), and overhead
(column I).
Column K divides the total cost in column j by the number of overrun days in column D to
calculate the per day costs.
Column L calculates a mark up of 22% of the per day cost in column K
Column M calculates the grand total per day by adding columns K and L
It is important to notice that the disruption model is not considered feasible when the percent
increase in resources is more that 100% - notice that no calculations were made for the last four
rows.
The last step is to use the probability of overrun from table (III - 2) and the corresponding
disruption per diem cost from column M, table (III - 7) to calculate the expected value for
disruption cost as shown in equation (1):
Disruption cost = 0.12 x 9,467 + 0.12 x 10,632 + 0.33 x 12,170 + 0.17 x 14,491 = $8,891 per day
............. ......... (1)
4. The Acceleration Model
Column C and D in the acceleration model table (III - 8) are similar to these in the disruption
model table (II -7)
Column E calculates the average days of overrun by averaging low and high values in columns C
and D.
Column F uses the overrun days in column E, and table (III - 3) to fill in the inefficiency factors.
Column G uses the overrun days in column E and table (III - 4) to fill in the cost factors.
Column H multiplies the value of labor cost of the impacted work (1,423,602), from table (III -
6), by (the inefficiency factor in column F, table (III -8) minus one) times (the cost factor in
column G, table (III - 8) minus one) to calculate the additional labor cost of overtime
inefficiency and premium payment.
Column I multiplies the value of equipment cost of the impacted work ($527,260), from table
(III - 6), by the (cost factor in column G minus one) to calculate the additional equipment cost.
Table (III - 9)
Table (III -8)
Acceleration Model
OCeun Days Ineffiencry Cost Adctional Aditional Adctioal Total Cost Prcatility d Expeted
Low Hgh I Ag. Factor Factor Labor Costs Eqip Costs O~read Costs Per Day Cerun Vue
C D E F G H I J K L M
0 11.25 5.625 1.05 1.10 $220,658 $52726 $110,725 $3340 0.12 $400.81
11.2 225 16875 1.10 1.10 $298,956 $2,726 $110,725 $4,21 0.12 $482151
225 3375 28125 110 1.10 $29,956 $5272 $110,725 $4,21 033 $1,326.91
3375 45 39.375 120 1.10 $45,f553 $2,726 $110,725 $5383 0.17 $915.05
45 67.5 5625 1.30 1.10 $612149 $52,726 $110,725 $6744 0.13 $876.76
675 90 7875 1.40 1.10 $768,745 $S72 $110,725 $8,106 0.09 $729.54
90 1125 101.25 1.40 1.10 $768,745 $52,726 $110,725 $8,106 003 $243.18
1125 1125 1.40 1.10 $768,745 $S2,726 $110,725 $8,106 0.01 $81.06
1.00 $5(05.83
arki-p: 22% $1,1122B
Tdtal: $6168.11
Cal: = ao.00
Similarly, column J multiplies the value of overhead cost of the impacted work ($1,107,246) by
the (cost factor minus one) to calculate the additional overhead cost.
Column K adds the labor, equipment and overhead costs and divides the total by the number of
delay days of expected duration of accelerated work (115), from table (III - 6), to calculate the
total additional costs per day.
Column L contains the overrun probability values which are obtained from table (III - 2).
The final step is to multiply each probability value in column L by each corresponding value in
column K (the results are calculated in column M) and add all the results to come up with the
expected value for the acceleration model, which is shown in table (III - 8) to be $6,200 per day.
5. The Delay Model
Delay Mdel
Comments
Primary Follow-on
Impaded Contract Value of Primary Contract
% of Contract Subcortracted
% of Subcontracts Impaded
Asaumed Contradct Duration
Time-Dependent Jobsite OCsts
Prnime Contradctor
Subcontradors
Home Office Overheads
Pime Contractor
Subcontradors
Escalation
Markup, Bonds& Insurance
Subtotal Primary Follow-on.
Escalation of Secondary Contracts (Quick Method)
$72,753,123
50.0%
50.0%
1,668 days
$10,913 pedday
$2,183 pedday
$2,181 pedday
$1,090 pedday
$6,677 per/day
$2,304 pedday
$25,348 pedday
From Key Data dieets
$/10 million
$1,500
$1,200
Escalation Rate:
Bonds
insurance
Profit
5.0%
10.0%
3.35%
0.5%
0.5%
9.0%
10.0%
Value of Secondary Contracts
Escalation rate:
Escalation per diem
Total:
Call:
$0
3.35%
$0 per/day
$25,348 per/day
$25,300 pedday
Table (III -9) assumes that the subcontracted value of the follow on contract will be 50% of the
total contract value, that 50% of the subcontracted work will be impacted by time extension, and
that the mark up is 10%.
The time-dependent job site overhead cost is calculated using data from table (III - 5).
The value used for the general contractor overhead cost is
1,500 per 10 million or 1,500 x 72,753,123/10,000,000 = $10,913 per day
The value for subcontractor is 1,200 x 0.5 x 0.5 x 72,753,123/10,000,000 = $2,183 per day
Table (HI -9)
Home office overhead is assumed to be 5% for the general contractor, and 10% for the
subcontracted work.
General contractor Home office overhead = 72,753,123 *.05/1668 days = $2,180 per day.
Subcontractors home office overhead = 72,753,123 x 0.5 x 0.5 x 0.10/1668 days = $1,090 per
day.
Escalation = 72,753,123 x 0.0335/365 = $6,677 per day
Adding 10% mark-up on top of all additional costs to calculate total delay costs:
Total cost per day for the delay model = 1.1 x (10,913 + 2,183 + 2,180 + 1,090 + 6,677) =
$25,348 .............. (3)
The Cost estimator compares the forecasted costs of the three models (the disruption cost of
$8,891, equation (1); the acceleration cost of $6,200 per day; and delay cost of $25,348, equation
(3)), along with the assumed self acceleration cost for the subject contract (table (III - 6), and the
nature and criticality of the two contracts to the whole project to decide the value to be
incorporated in the liquidated damages clause for the subject contract.
As Of OCTOBER 1997
* Excluding Police details, and other commitments
CURRENT
ESCALATE ORIGINAL
BUDGET BID VALUECONTRACT
PACKAGE
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
N 113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
11,653,996
49,181,633
149,635,990
1,761,025
63,976,080
3,047,585
8,064,854
1,601,776
164,410,952
61,413,851
114,229,503
117,034,259
424,522,127
177,210,494
46,172,876
16,063,520
404,776,399
117,138,846
259,358,343
165,265,315
85,652,717
357,985,242
53,970,064
23,903,072
4,175,971
17,099,193
34,796,748
356,320
1,701,396
14,674,572
8,399,723
899,920
2,662,586
2,729,767
MODIFICATIONS
b
17,10010,691,582
45,947,788
101,456,070
1,645,818
50,869,770
2,848,210
7,307,818
1,496,987
152,422,783
57,987,115
76,778,000
108,576,515
377,933,000
159,979,256
37,921,740
12,473,976
377,340,990
106,972,972
241,457,711
147,239,356
72,430,000
339,487,273
50,420,621
22,270,766
3,898,044
13,469,000
17,430,000
374,010
1,590,000
11,944,000
7,573,000
556,443
2,163,564
2,657,385
PAY ITEM
OVERUN
<UNDERUN
c
398,734
840,711
2,500
335,367
2,062,416
47,180
116,903
-330,313
24,952
3,789,486
-13
9,690
11,760
-15,310
-1
1,000
-61,890
-182,920
APPROVED/
AUTHORIZED
TRENDS
CLAIMS UNDER
CURRENT* REVIEW/
FORECAST PENDING
f=sum(a..d) ISSUES
-71,973 10,636,709 100,634
45,947,788
10,823,028 151,347,565 -369,612
20,000 1,701,218 10,016
1,284,213 65,714,766 691,035
313,015 3,343,210 645,252
50,001 7,623,414
530,239 3,122,795 155,000
5,045,731 158,163,238 3,924,220
6,900,905 69,975,985 1,697,683
11,426,719 109,619,004 1,486,636
4,853,646 113,294,336 1,397,900
15,572,636 430,876,871 22,856,530
1,506,222 168,975,635 6,404
1,957,394 47,044,398 5,442,487
702,161 15,339,062 655,021
1,571,578 379,395,287 -258,042
439,329 112,359,094 2,715,914
993,833 242,460,769 1,892,284
-835,109 158,167,434 1,580,114
4,717,786 82,083,639 2,331,310
3,676,227 343,866,533 763,215
408,267 51,239,324 380,565
500,000 22,749,295 238,280
502 3,869,276 -3,000
700,000 17,845,966 253,509
6,628,485 38,213,906 72,778
356,320
1,697,477
14,674,938
56,590 8,367,352 9,892
239,988 889,256 -3,114
2,648,858
2,727,609
FUTURE POTENTIAL
ALLOWANCE FORECAST
g
748,411
3,216,345
2,004,947
115,207
1,946,910
463,304
10,580,565
2,368,420
361,908
5,337,297
10,375,413
8,651,785
1,447,171
25,513,869
5,271,834
16,036,760
6,773,183
7,191,103
17,277,653
2,626,190
858,793
TOTAL
CHANGE
(AS % of
BID VALUE)
h=e++g
11,485,754 7%
49,164,133 7%
152,982,900 51%
1,826,441 11%
68,352,711 34%
3,988,462 40%
8,086,718 11%
3,277,795 119%
172,686,597 13%
74,305,093 28%
111,583,054 45%
121,020,445 110/0
466,672,640 23%
179,439,444 12%
55,484,932 46%
16,673,102 34%
405,672,655 8%
120,587,561 13%
261,801,558 8%
167,327,044 14%
91,612,669 26%
362,338,447 7%
54,266,078 8%
23,919,720 7%
3,871,339 -1%
18,102,179 34%
38,340,665 120%
356,320 -5%
1,699,785 7%
14,674,939 23%
8,394,554 11%
886,142 59%
2,662,586 23%
2,729,767 3%
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38,669,733
35,400
13,560,783
181,985
265,595
1,095,569
-145,987
5,085,465
21,078,918
-135,825
35,308,819
7,442,977
7,048,361
2,493,238
482,719
4,921,841
9,225
7,973,701
4,935,853
703,046
400,746
-21,471
-41,030
3,676,966
14,155,421
-2,380
107,477
2,730,939
736,762
92,825
547,184
253,144
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As Of OCTOBER 1997
* Excluding Police details, and other commitments
CURRENT
ESCALATE ORIGINAL
CONTRACT BUDGET BID VALUE
PACKAGE a a
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
N 147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
976,520
11,363,584
12,311,792
316,099,007
176,232,178
425,001,555
78,210,224
21,757,566
8,260,010
35,075,354
34,156,778
26,490,286
6,225,076
6,289,479
28,664,906
474,500
3,081,072
10,473,100
12,958,794
580,963
422,957
565,293
1,637,244
1,654,002
1,362,094
1,542,664
1,830,910
856,294
755,386
5,015,012
248,263,398
20,701,637
2,735,744
10,872,141
950,036
4,886,375
10,987,580
297,721,731
157,968,871
397,459,140
49,495,000
19,165,637
6,737,000
20,494,476
27,392,820
19,983,533
3,797,971
5,627,200
23,457,510
405,173
2,638,817
10,915,823
10,786,820
576,528
410,000
547,500
1,631,643
1,788,544
1,355,375
1,379,000
1,770,839
859,500
788,575
4,659,035
179,149,600
16,706,343
2,553,120
8,817,534
MODIFICATIONS
b
8,670
5,871,435
948,849
905,656
3,575,774
-185,820
28,684,263
1,781,653
1,105,784
13,983,389
5,689,253
6,150,471
2,254,059
444,906
4,585,349
69,327
442,255
-443,026
2,171,974
4,434
12,957
17,793
31,602
-169,826
-3,168
162,312
60,071
-6,976
-36,790
450,615
68,655,077
3,993,657
161,617
2,005,113
PAY ITEM
OVERUN
<UNDERUN
c
109,841
111,992
16,500
116,977
-83,981
-67,892
-31,948
45,176
-371
-157,941
-1
APPROVE
AUTHORIZ
TRENDS
d
2
1
8
1
-5
2
D/
ED
CURRENT *
FORECAST
f=sum(a..d)
e
CLAIMS UNDER
REVIEW/
PENDING
ISSUES
f
958,706
,244,211 13,002,021 1,298,844
,446,171 13,492,441 101,900
,276,209 306,903,596 1,101,975
,021,471 162,678,108 3,618,832
,189,002 392,084,318 -1,243,410
-31,608 78,147,655 59,500
,503,000 23,466,790
12,886 7,855,670 16,262
34,594,842
879,944 33,878,036
167,000 26,233,112 113,956
6,020,082
6,117,282
28,042,488
474,500
3,081,072
10,472,797
12,958,794
580,962
422,957
565,293
1,663,245
1,618,718
1,352,207
1,541,312
1,830,910
852,524
751,785
4,951,709
247,804,676
20,700,000
2,714,737
10,822,647
FUTURE
ALLOWANCE
g
POTENTIAL
FORECAST
h=e+f+g
TOTAL
CHANGE
(AS % of
BID VALUE)
965,480 2%
107,667 14,420,892 195%
13,779,420 25%
18,161,362 326,564,433 10%
7,977,933 176,315,755 12%
27,695,098 418,906,282 5%
78,207,155 58%
23,546,357 23%
7,905,986 17%
35,075,354 71%
34,123,450 25%
26,582,907 33%
6,225,076 64%
6,289,479 12%
28,664,911 22%
474,500 17%
3,081,072 17%
10,473,100 -4%
12,958,794 20%
580,962 1%
422,957 3%
565,293 3%
1,637,244 0%
1,654,002 -8%
1,362,094 0%
1,542,664 12%
1,830,910 3%
856,294 0%
755,386 -4%
5,015,012 8%
248,263,398 39%
20,701,637 24%
2,718,481 6%
10,872,141 23%
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As Of OCTOBER 1997
* Excluding Police details, and other commitments
CURRENT
ESCALATE ORIGINAL
CONTRACT BUDGET BID VALUE
PACKAGE a a
MODIFICATIONS
b
1,848,303 1,747,829
250,840,631 226,896,824 23
6,286,934 5,147,750
17,600,581 14,562,419 2
4,177,935 2,260,000 1
5,395,250 5,395,250
78,210,224 49,495,000 28
320,939,434 245,964,000 75
21,757,566 19,165,637 1
8,260,010 6,737,000 1
35,075,354 20,494,476 13
4,175,971 3,898,044
70,269
1,877,971
941,748
,441,618
,755,953
,684,263
,444,088
,781,653
,105,784
,983,389
-41,030
PAY ITEM
OVERUN
<UNDERUN
-1,715,972
16,500
116,977
11,760
APPROVED/
AUTHORIZED
TRENDS
-31
-75
2,503
12
CURRENT*
FORECAST
f=sum(a..d)
e
1,818,098
250,774,795
6,089,498
17,004,037
4,015,953
5,395,250
,608 78,147,655
,000 319,617,116
,000 23,466,790
,886 7,855,670
34,594,842
502 3,869,276
CLAIMS UNDER
REVIEWI
PENDING FUTURE
ISSUES ALLOWANCE
f g
59,500
209,715
16,262
-3,000
Average Change Percentage ====> 18%
Attachment 1
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
POTENTIAL
FORECAST
h=e+f+g
1,848,303
250,840,631
6,286,934
17,600,581
4,177,935
5,395,250
78,207,155
320,940,265
23,546,357
7,905,986
35,075,354
3,871,339
TOTAL
CHANGE
(AS % of
BID VALUE)
6%
11%
22%
21%
85%
0%
58%
30%
23%
17%
71%
-1%
_ _ __ _ _1 _ __ I 1____T_ _ 1
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Name of Bidder
SCHEDULE OF QUANTITIES AND PRICES
PAYMENT
ITEM., .:::
100.00
[NAME OF CONTRACT AND (NUMBER)]
($ )
100.100 
X
($ )
100 200 
X
Total Estimated
Contract Price (Price In Words) 
(Price in Figures)
200.000 Milestone 1 Days Saved Forty-Two Thosuand, One hundred 
X
not to Exceed 93 
Days
(042,100.00)
200.100 Milestone 2 Days Saved Twenty-Five Thousand. Eight Hundred 
X
not to Exceed 120 
Days
($25,800.00)
TOTAL ADJUSTMENT FOR
DAYS SAVED: 
(Price in Figures)
TOTAL ESTIMATED CONTRACT PRICE MINUS 
$
TOTAL ADJUSTMENT FOR DAYS AVED, EQUALS 
Price in Figufesl
TOTAL PROPOSAL PRICE FOR BIDDER SELECTION:
096-1 )
Schedule of Quantities and Prices
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Code No. I I
IV. Alternatives to Liquidated Damages
A. Introduction
This chapter will examine the applicability of the Liquidated Damages Clause to multi-contract
projects in general. The pros and cons of liquidated damages, as well as their limitations on the
CA/T Project will be also discussed.
Finally, several forms of incentive/disincentive methods will be explored as alternatives to
liquidated damages, along with examples of public projects, which have successfully
implemented a form of an incentive/disincentive clause on their contracts.
B. Limitations of Liquidated Damages on the CA/T Project
1. Enforceability
Construction projects are generally characterized by uniqueness and therefore uncertainty. Each
project is essentially subject to changes due to numerous reasons, such as different site
conditions, design changes, Owner's caused delays, changes in regulations and requirements by
other agencies. Such changes could potentially affect the project cost and/or duration.
This phenomenon is more evident in multi-contract projects. Because of the interfaces between
contracts, a delay caused by a change in one contract could have a domino effect on many other
contracts. This increases the likelihood of changes and potential delays in any of the contracts of
a multi-contract project more than in a single contract project.
Additionally, multi-contract projects are often mega projects and are affected by many
stakeholders, who collectively contribute to changes to its scope of work and subsequently to its
duration. Because of the complexity of such projects and the many interfaces each contract
usually has, the process of apportioning delays to the parties which caused them becomes
extremely difficult. This jeopardizes the enforceability of the liquidated damages clause in
multi-contract projects.
The CA/T project is an example of a multi-contract project, which not only contains hundreds of
contracts, but also involves many State, City, and Federal agencies, in addition to neighboring
businesses, residents, and abutters. All these external forces continuously impact the CA/T
project and inevitably cause changes and potential delays to its contracts. This makes the CA/T
project vulnerable to delay, and when a delay eventually happens, most of the time at least an
external entity is involved, and it is difficult to separate the delay caused by the contractor from
that caused by others.
One more factor that makes the CA/T project vulnerable to changes beyond the contractor's
control is the nature of its major work. Tunneling, and utilities relocation, which are the majority
of the CA/T project's work, accompanied by the project site in downtown Boston, which is
68
mainly landfill, make differing site conditions the norm. Attachment I shows a sample of CA/T
contracts with the forecasted percentage of changes in contract price.
Another factor is the project's fast track approach for procurement, which allows construction
and design to take place concurrently, rather than sequentially, to reduce the overall project
duration. The project is divided into hundreds of design packages which interface with each
other. The design of the whole project was not completed when construction started. Rather,
early and preparatory work were designed, packaged and awarded before the follow on work.
As early on contracts were underway, development of design could necessitate changes in the
on-going construction.
An example is the design and the issuance of bidding documents for an early construction
contract, which contains as part of its scope of work the construction of slurry walls to be used
by a follow on contract as support of excavation for a tunnel. At the time of issuance of the early
contract, the complete and detailed design of the follow on tunnel was not finalized. As the final
design takes shape, changes in the design of the early, now on-going construction contract could
be necessary.
Also, because of the repetitive nature of the project contracts, significant lessons learned from
substantially complete projects could be incorporated into similar contracts that are still in the
early construction stage as change orders.
As many of the court cases presented in Chapter II indicated, the liquidated damages clause is
not enforceable when the cause of delay can not be apportioned reasonably between the Owner
and the Contractor This raises the question about the enforceability of liquidated damages on
the CA/T project, which is vulnerable to changes caused by many forces other than the
contractor.
2. Cost Effectiveness
2.1 Adversarial relationship and less competition
When liquidated damages are assessed against a contractor, especially when the cause is in
dispute, an adversarial relationship between the Owner and the Contractor is created
The nature of the CA/T project makes it difficult for the government to permit such relationships.
Adversarial relationships easily lead to further construction delays. The financial and political
impact on the project as well as the impact on traffic, the business community, and roadway
users from time delays in construction far outweigh any financial gain by the Department from
assessing liquidated damages.
If an adversarial relationship between the project and a contractor develops on one of its
contracts, this will affect the subject contract, other contracts that involve the same contractor, as
well as future bids by this contractor, and eventually the outcome of its future bids.
Also, Contractors on the subject contract as well as other contracts will be defensive which can
make them unwilling, or less cooperative in coordinating work with externals, but rather trying
to take advantage and to build evidence in anticipation of inevitable disputes regarding
anticipated liquidated damages assessment
Despite the Department many attempts to attract new bidders, only a few contractors repeatedly
bid the CA/T contracts. As a matter of fact, more than 30% of all awarded contracts have been
won by the same contractor (Modem Continental Construction of Massachusetts alone, or with
its Japanese partner Obayashi).
Assessing Liquidated damages against a contractor could affect its cash flow and therefore its
performance on the subject contract and on other contracts the contractor has on the project. It
will also affect the contractor's ability to bid future jobs in a reasonable price.
If the contractor is financially hurt, it may not bid future jobs and therefore the project will have
less competition.
Dispute over assessed liquidated damages and the responsibility of delays will drain scarce
resources of the contractor and the Department. It will also damage the reputation the
Department pride itself with for having a zero-litigation project. The litigation cost will also
prove costly to both parties.
2.2 Higher risk and higher bids
The CA/T estimating model, which was illustrated in Chapter III, does not estimate damages to a
contract beyond its immediate follow-on contract. This assumes that all delays will be
recovered no later than the completion date of the follow-on contract. This is not necessarily
true and the reason for the assumption is that liquidated damages become very expensive if the
effect of the delay is considered until the end of the project.
High liquidated damages per diem will be reflected in higher bids, which will mean higher
project cost. Another example of high liquidated damages is the ones allocated to significant and
strategic milestones. When a milestone can not be delayed, how much liquidated damages
should it have? An example is the milestone for the opening of the Third Harbor Tunnel, which
was publicized and is expected to result in major traffic relief to the public
The whole world knew that December 15, 1995, is the date on which the Ted Williams Tunnel,
also known as The Third Harbor Tunnel (THT), is to be opened to traffic. Any delay was to
undermine the credibility of the CA/T officials, its Management Consultant, and therefore the
budgeted costs and completion date of the Project. It will also worsen the already delicate image
of the Project in the eyes of the residents of Boston and Massachusetts.
Estimating the actual damages to the owner for every invaluable day of delay to the opening of
THT will render high cost. However, incorporating such cost in the bidding documents as
liquidated damages will make bids very expensive. As a result, an amount of $8,500 per day was
incorporated as liquidated damages for substantial completion milestone in the bid documents of
the THT finishes contract, with an understanding that progress will be monitored very carefully
and corrective actions will be proactively made to support the publicized milestone's date
Another example will be the milestone dates committed to third parties to complete work in their
premises on certain dates. Failure to do so will create friction between the Department and the
involved third party, and will spoil the cooperation in the affected contract, present contracts, as
well as negotiation for future work.
An example will be the work in North Station Rail yard area. The Project promised MBTA to
complete work there in two years. This work involves two sequential contracts. Failure of either
contract to finish on time will fail the project's promise. The invaluable cost for breaking this
commitment is hard to estimate and was not included in estimating the liquidated damages for
the involved contracts.
3. Difficulty
Liquidated damages on the CA/T are hard to estimate and hard to administer. Some of the
milestones they are tied to are to implement certain traffic phases on or before a certain date.
However, such traffic implementation is meaningless, if not coordinated with neighboring
contracts and if the intended scope of work within the area is not complete.
In such cases, full cooperation from all involved contractors is mandatory to successfully
implement and switch traffic to the new pattern. In some cases, a contractor may wait beyond its
contractual milestone date to achieve that goal. If liquidated damages are assessed blindly in
such cases the overall objective of finishing the whole project on time will be undermined.
C. Alternatives to Liquidated Damages on the CA/T
1. Incentive/Disincentive Clauses
Incentive/disincentive provisions provide for extra monetary bonus to the contractor for underrun
of selected project milestone(s), as well as penalty in case of overrun.
They are recommended by FHWA to be used where construction needs to be kept to a short
duration, as it creates a great deal of inconvenience to traffic, as well as loss of roadway use, and
significant revenue loss to businesses. They are also suitable where estimated liquidated
damages amount is too high compared to the project value. In such cases, if liquidated damages
are to be used, unreasonable high bids could be submitted reflecting the risk of losses in the
event of overrun.
When applied effectively, in addition to, or in lieu of liquidated damages, incentive/disincentive
provisions can promote high performance standards by the contractor. In this approach, the
contractor is motivated not only to meet, but also to beat the contract milestone(s), by allocating
resources more efficiently, by using innovative means and methods, and by being proactive in
identifying potential delays and therefore taking preventive and corrective actions.
In contrast, conventional lump sum competitively bid contracts with liquidated damages clauses
do not encourage early completion, but rather discourage late completion and create consequence
adversarial relationship between the project team players, as the focus is shifted towards
avoidance of penalties and potential claims, rather than efficient contract management and
performance.
When incentive/disincentive provisions are used in addition to liquidated damages, their
monetary values have to be estimated independent of the liquidated damages amount. Failure to
do so will cause the incentive/disincentive provision to be considered an unenforceable penalty.
This concept was established by the court ruling presented in 2.1 case one in Chapter II.
Incentive/disincentive, as well as liquidated damages, provisions are only as good as the
milestones to which they are applied. The Owner must clearly establish logical, realistic, and
achievable milestones. A detailed analysis of each milestone logic, intent, and objectives need to
be performed carefully before issuing bidding documents, and then clearly communicated to
bidders in the bid documents.
A good example of the incentive/disincentive clause is the one that was implemented by
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA) on a 15.5 million contract to renovate the Callahan
tunnel. The tunnel transports as many as 3,500 vehicles each hour. MTA allowed work on the
tunnel only between midnight and 5:30 AM; with severe liquidated damages if the contractor
failed to restore tunnel service by 5:30 AM ready for morning traffic. In addition the contract
included an incentive/disincentive clause, which called for a bonus or penalty of 5,000 per day,
depending on whether the contractor finishes before or after the contractual date for substantial
completion.
The following is a script of the incentive/disincentive clause, followed by a script of the
liquidated damages clause:
"In the event of an underrun or overrun of the time allowed for the
completion of the contract, final payment otherwise due the contractor shall be
adjusted from the specified completion date plus any time extensions
approved under contract provisions, as follows:
(1) For each day underrun up to 30 calendar days, payment shall be increased by
$5, 000 per calendar day.
(2) For each day overrun up to 30 calendar days, payment shall be decreased by
$5, 000 per calendar day.
Maximum amount to apply to incentive and disincentive shall be $150, 000.
Payment for underruns shall be added to payments to the contractor.
Charges for overrun will be deducted from payments to the contractor.
There shall be no further adjustment for overrun or underrun exceeding 30 days.
The incentive/disincentive clause shall be tied to the established substantial
completion date.
Substantial Completion shall be defined as the completion of all elements of this
contract, such that the work is complete, usable, operational, tested, approved,
and accepted by the MTA. Further, substantial completion shall include all
punch list items that must be completed in the tunnel proper (i.e. roadway area)
or approach areas, however minor in scope. Any contract work or punch list
work requiring afull tunnel closure or single lane closure shall be considered
outside of the scope of substantial completion.
In addition, all work in this contract which takes place in ventilation or other
tunnel division structures, supply or exhaust plenums, pump chambers or any
other MTA property other than the tunnel proper or approaches shall be
completed in its entirety as outlined in the preceding paragraph, with the
exception that minor punch list items in these areas may be completed after
substantial completion and prior to actual completion. Minor punch list items are
defined as rudimentary or final cleanup, touch-up work or minor adjustments
requiring no more than the use of hand tools.
"Each day, liquidated damages will be assessed to the contractor for each half
hour or part thereof he fails to vacate the Callahan tunnel roadway and its
attendant approaches by 5:30 A.M. The assessed liquidated damages will be in
accordance with the following schedule:
Failure to Total Daily Liquidated
Vacate by Damages Assessed
5:30:01 $5,000
A.M
6:00:01 $25,000
A.M
6:30:01 $65,000
A.M
Whatever sum of money may become due and payable to the Authority by the
Contractor under provisions of this paragraph may be retained out of the monies
due or become due to the contractor in the possession of the Authority. The
provision shall be construed or treated by the parties of the contract not as
imposing a penalty upon the contractor for failure to vacate. "
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Incentive/disincentive estimates need to abide by the same rules as liquidated damages are;
otherwise they can be challenged in Court On the above example, the $5,000 per day amount.
was the estimated cost to the MTA for administering the nightly bore closing, which was
required to permit the work in the tunnel.
The contractor on this job, Kiewit Eastern/Mass. Electric, completed the job 30 days ahead of
schedule and was awarded a $150,000 bonus for early completion of the work.
2. A+B Bid
This bidding system has been used by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for about 20 years
under the name "bidding on cost/time". In this method, the total cost of the project to the owner,
not only construction cost is taking into account. As such, contractors bid on the construction
cost as part A and also on the total duration of the job as part B, and the lowest responsible
combined bidder is awarded the project.
Construction cost (Part A) is bid like any other conventional bidding system The prices of bid
items included in part A are used to pay the contractor's requisitions. To calculate part B, the
Owner first estimates the value of a time unit (usually a day). That is the cost to the owner for
every day that goes by and the project is not complete, or in other words how much the owner is
willing to pay to have the job completed one day earlier. Each bidder bid the number of days
they need to construct the project. Part B is then calculated as the product of the cost per day as
provided by the Owner by the project duration as bid by each contractor. The total bid price is
the total cost of the project to the owner; that is the construction cost (part A), plus the time cost
to the Owner (part B). The responsible bidder with the lowest total cost to the owner is then
awarded the bid.
The legal aspects of the A+B method were investigated by Harp (1990), who concluded that the
method does not violate the competitive bidding concept and therefore is applicable to public
projects. Also, 101 projects that have been awarded using the A + B method were studied by
Herbsman (1995), who compared them to similar projects that were bid using conventional
methods and concluded that substantial savings in construction time have been achieved when
using the A + B method with almost no addition in cost. The research also concluded that the
method is most suitable to rehabilitation and replacement of roadways and bridges. These
projects are normally built in urban areas usually under heavy traffic volume. Construction
under such circumstances creates major inconveniences to the public, in terms of lost time,
revenue and also lost value of life as a result of environmental pollution. Therefore, reducing
construction duration becomes a major priority, which warrants the need for a bidding strategy,
which accounts for construction duration as well as construction, cost.
An incentive/disincentive provision is usually applied to the dates set in part B by the bidder. All
of the case studies, which were reviewed, used an incentive/disincentive provision to enforce and
motivate contractor performance to meet or beat the bid construction duration.
3. A + B Bid with Incentive/Disincentive Clauses
This is a combination of the A + B approach with incentive/disincentive clause to encourage
performance. This method is typically used when the expedition of construction process is
extremely important to the Owner, because of high costs and inconvenience resulting from
construction and loss of facility use.
This approach gives the contractor a motivation to beat the Engineer's schedule by reducing the
construction duration and therefore the B portion of its bid. This gives the contractor a better
chance to win the bid. Once construction starts, the incentive/disincentive clause motivates the
contractor to beat its own schedule as bid, or at least to meet said date.
A project example, which had successfully implemented this method, is the Santa Monica
Freeway Bridge Reconstruction in California. This job was bid using A + B bid with
incentive/disincentive clause to motivate the contractor to reduce the construction duration. This
bridge was damaged by the Northridge earthquake in 1994. Loss of use of the bridge caused a
lot of inconvenience, delays, as well as revenue losses to businesses. The California Trucking
Association reported that opening the freeway early will save their commercial operators more
than $500,000 per day in trucking cost (Carr 1994).
The contractor's duration estimate in part B was 140 days. The incentive/disincentive fee was
$200,000 per day for every day the contractor finishes the project ahead off/behind the estimate
provided for in its part B bid (the 140 days). The $200,000 incentive/disincentive fee was
calculated by the Owner, California Department of Transportation (CALTRANS) obviously did
not account for revenue loss by businesses such as the trucking Association.
The contractor completed the job in 66 days, 74 days ahead of schedule, and was therefore
awarded $14,800,000 in bonus for the early completion of the project. The bonus fee was
approximately equal to the total contractor's bid price for the whole job ($14,904,275).
4. A-BBid
This is a form of A + B bidding that has been studied by the CA/T Project officials to be used on
one of its utilities contracts. However, due to a protest from the Construction Industries of
Massachusetts, Inc., the provisions to use A-B bidding process had been removed from the
bidding documents and the contract was awarded the conventional way to the lowest bidder in
February, 1997, and the use of A-B bidding on the CA/T has been postponed.
On this method, as in A+B, A is the Bid Price, however B is the number of days the contractor
bid to save against the contract milestone, instead of the total duration to complete the milestone.
The awarded contract will reflect the reduced duration, if any, as proposed by the lowest
responsible bidder in its bid, and the dates of milestones will be modified in the Contract
Documents to reflect the shortened duration to which the contractor has committed itself. The
liquidated damages contained in the contract documents would commence upon expiration of
those adjusted milestones duration.
The following is the (A - B) bidding process script which was later deleted from one of the
CA/T utilities contract bidding documents.
"Special Instructions to bidders
Introduction
A Schedule Optimization Program is incorporated into the biddingprocess of this
Contract to allow each Bidder to best implement its means and methods, within
the terms and conditions of the contract documents, for completion of the work at
the earliest feasible opportunity, to the advantage of both the successful Bidder
and the Department.
An incentive is provided to bidders to bid "Days Saved" to Milestone 2,
Substantial Completion. Bidders may bidfrom 0 to a maximum of 100 Days
saved.
The "Total Estimated Contract Price, " is the sum of Bid Items 101.1 through
996. 010, contained in the Schedule of Quantities and Prices in the Itemized
Proposal submitted as a bid? This Total Estimated Contract Price remains
unchanged whether or not the Bidder chooses to bid days Saved more than 0. The
Total Estimated Contract Price is referred to as "part A ", for convenience.
The Adjustment for Days Saved is a number of Days Saved bidfor Milestone 2
(from 0 to a maximum of 100 Days) multiplied by a value of $4, 000 per Day. The
Adjustment for Days Saved is referred to as "part B ", for convenience.
The Proposal Price shall be determined by subtracting the Adjustment for Days
saved from the Total Estimated Contract Price; that is part A minus part B.
Contract Award shall be made to the Bidder who submits the lowest Proposal
Price with its bid, and satisfies all other requirements for Contract Award, as
provided for in the Contract Documents, who shall be considered the lowest
responsible Bidder.
Milestone 2 duration in any executed contract will be decreasedfrom the base
duration appearing in Division I, Special Provision 8.03, by the number of Days
Saved bid by the lowest responsible Bidder. Milestone 1 duration will also be
decreased by the same number of days, since Final Acceptance is intended to be
60 Days after Substantial Completion.
During the Contract, the basis for payment to the Contractor will be the bid
prices for Bid Items 101.1 through 996.010 in the Schedule of Quantities and
Prices submitted by the Contractor in its Itemized Proposal.
Add Bid Items 101.1 through 996.010 in the Schedule of Quantities and Prices.
and insert this figure on the line marked A. TOTAL ESTIMATED CONTRACT
PRICE.
Insert the number of Days Saved to Milestone 2 (from Oto a maximum of 100) you
intend to bid in B. ADJUSTMENT FOR DAYS SAVED.
Multiply the Days Saved by $4, 000 and insert the product on "Total in Figures"
on line B.
Subtract the figure representing the AJUSTMENT FOR DAYS SA VED from the
figure representing the TOTAL ESTIMA TED CONTRACT PRICE and insert the
result on the line marked PRPOSAL PRICE. This result will be the PROPOSAL
PRICE for Bidder selection, which will be evaluated for contract award purposes.
EXAMPLE
A. TOTAL ESTIMA TED CONTRACT PRICE $1,000,000
B. ADJUSTMENT FOR DAYS SAVED $4,000 X 30 Days = $120,000
PROPOSAL PRICE (A-B) $880,000"
Attachment 2 is a sample of the Schedule of Quantities and Prices of a CA/T contract which was
intended to use the A - B Bidding approach.
5. Mobilization Bid Item
In this method, the payment structure is used to motivate contractor's performance. On the
CA/T project, 50 % of Mobilization (bid item number 748.) is usually paid with the first pay
requisition. 25% is then paid when the contract is 5% complete, and the remaining 25% is paid
when the contract is 10% complete.
On January 1997, the author of this paper suggested to the Management Consultant of the CA/T
project to change the payment structure of the Mobilization Bid Item to encourage contractor
performance towards achieving milestones instead of using percentages. The idea is still to pay
50% of Mobilization (about 2.5% of the total contract value) with the first payment requisition.
This will encourage bidders (as they currently do) to fully bid the maximum allowed amount for
this bid item (5%). By doing that, the Mobilization Bid Item becomes a significant payment item
to the contractor's cash flow. The remaining of this bid item could be then tied to the
achievement of selected interim milestones, instead of project percentage of completion. An
example would be to pay 30% when milestone A is substantially complete, and the remaining
20% when milestone B is substantially complete.
The approach had never been implemented as suggested; however, a similar approach was used
to promote performance by making payment of the remaining 50% of mobilization subject to
completion of certain tasks by the contractor, such as approval of selected critical submittals, and
approval of the preliminary schedule.
6. Demobilization Bid Item
This method was studied on the CA/T project to be used to as an incentive for contractors to
achieve project's substantial completion.
The method uses demobilization bid item, which is included in the Schedule of Quantities and
Prices, and therefore is bid for by contractors. The payment of this bid item is made once the
contractor achieves substantial completion. This was thought to be a motivation for the
contractor to allocate and plan its resources efficiently to achieve substantial completion, and
therefore be eligible to receive the demobilization payment.
The assumption was that the fair value of demobilizing the site would be significant enough to
motivate performance. However, the significance of such bid item will depend on the price the
contractor is willing to bid for it. This raised a concern among project officials that contractors
could be tempted to unbalance their bids by low-bid this pay item since its payment takes place
at the end of the job, and therefore becomes insignificant cash producer to the contractor and
defies its purpose.
As a result this method was not implemented and no further options were experimented to
prevent from unbalancing this bid item (for instance to set a minimum price that the contractors
are instructed not to bid lower than it for the Demobilization Bid Item).
7. Retention
Another method in which payments structure can be used to motivate the contractor's
performance. The idea is to reduce retention percentage as major interim milestones are
achieved. This will increase the contractor's cash flow which is a major advantage to the
contractor specially in mega projects such as the CA/T, and therefore becomes a motivation to
the contractor to plan its work and resources more efficiently to achieve the Owner Strategic
milestone(s).
On the CA/T, 5% of the total value of executed work is retained from each progress payment.
This retainage ceases to be applied when the project is 25% complete, regardless of the
contractor's performance schedule wise. Using retention as an incentive to achieve a milestone,
the 5% retention provision shall be stopped once a significant milestone is substantially
complete.
8. Fee Milestone
This is a form of the incentive/disincentive approach. However, it is established after the job is
awarded and therefore relies on successful negotiation between the Owner and the Contractor.
In this method, after the contract is underway, the Owner due to unanticipated changes and or
circumstances requires a certain milestone to be achieved earlier, or to create a new milestone.
This requires modifying the contract documents.
To ensure performance, the contractor is usually offered an incentive to reach the new milestone
date. Also a disincentive is applied if the contractor fails to meet that date.
9. Fee at Risk
An example of the incentive/disincentive approach used by the CA/T is the performance-based
variable percentage, which is used to pay the Management Consultant fee.
Under its contract with the Department, the Management Consultant fee is 10%. An
incentive/disincentive clause was then amended to the contract. The base fee is 10%. And there
is a 2% at risk fee and a 2% incentive fee. Based on the Management Consultant performance,
the fee could be adjusted downward, up to 8%; or upward, up to 12%.
The performance is measured using a matrix, which takes into account schedule, cost, and
quality of the Management Consultant's work. The following pie chart illustrates the criteria
used to evaluate performance along with the weight used against each criterion.
12.5%
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50.0%
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The criteria to measure performance are adjusted once every six months. The intention is to
keep such criteria more objective than subjective, in order to be easier to be measured and to
reduce the negotiation effort and make the exercise less painful and not personal.
V. Conclusions and Recommendations
A. Conclusions
The contractor, as well as the Owner, is interested in a complete project as soon as possible, or at
least not behind its contractual dates. For reasons attributed to both parties, either party, or
neither party, construction contracts and their interim milestones often finish behind schedule.
Liquidated damages clauses are the most common mechanism used in public projects to
compensate the public Owner for losses caused by delays that are the fault of the contractor.
Liquidated damages provisions are not enforceable if the disputed delay is caused by other forces
beyond, or concurrent with delays caused by, the contractor.
Multi contract projects are usually complicated projects with many stakeholders, and as such are
usually more vulnerable to changes. This phenomenon increases the likelihood of any contract
of a multi contract project to fall behind schedule.
Liquidated damages clauses are not effective in multi contract projects because:
They can be challenged in court since it is unlikely to prove that a delay is not attributed
to factors other than the contractor.
The success of such complex projects in part relies on the full cooperation of a limited
number of large contractors who can bid its contracts; and assessment of liquidated damages
could ruin the relationship between the project and its contractors.
The estimated liquidated damages amounts for most contracts, especially those on the
overall project critical path, can be huge. Incorporating these amounts in the contract bidding
documents could result in higher bids and higher total cost.
Other incentive/disincentive provisions have been successfully used on some public projects.
These provisions promote the contractor's performance and penalize its lack of performance.
They can be applied during bid period and they can also be applied post bid award.
On a multi contract project, since changes are inevitable, the successful application of
incentive/disincentive provisions is limited. When a delay happens, the dispute will not be only
about the enforceability of liquidated damages, but it will be also about whether the contractor is
eligible to receive the incentive amount. The contractor can argue that if it were not to the
forces beyond its control, it would have finished ahead of schedule and therefore be eligible to
receive the incentive payment.
Post bid award incentives depend on successful negotiations with the contractor and are usually
not beneficial to the Owner. Pre bid award incentives/disincentive provisions require the
contractor to develop and study carefully a detailed CPM schedule for the project. This is a
lengthy and time-consuming project, especially for multi-million dollar contracts. If the Owner
does not allow enough time for bidders to do such analysis, the benefits of the
incentive/disincentive process will not be achieved in the bid results.
As such, applying these provisions without modifications to a multi-contract project may even
increase the number of claims, create friction between the project and its contractors, and
increase the project total cost.
Some initiatives are introduced to the CA/T Project to promote performance. They use payment
mechanisms to implicitly reward the contractor's performance. Tying payments of certain
milestone(s) such as Mobilization and reducing the retention amount when certain milestone(s)
are achieved are examples of these initiatives.
Incentives based on payment mechanism can work in multi-contract Projects, however there is
no proven record of their effectiveness to encourage the contractor's timely performance of its
contractual milestone(s).
The CA/T Project has successfully used the Mobilization payment to force the contractor to
comply with timely performance of early, critical submittals.
B. Recommendations
The following recommendations are offered to overcome the shortfalls of liquidated damages
and incentive/disincentive provisions when applied in a complicated multi-contract project such
as the CA/T Project:
For the liquidated damages clause, or any other mechanism, to be effective, the Owner must first
minimize post contract award changes. This could be achieved by:
Invite the contract stakeholders to the early stages of the design to get and incorporate
their input as feasible into the design. If the stakeholders buy into the contract design, they are
less likely to require changes afterwards.
Perform as many soil exploration and test pits as possible during design. The money and
time spent during this process are much cheaper than modifying the contract's design during
construction.
Allow more time and money for the design process. If the time is not available,
innovative ideas and brainstorming sessions need to be presented to repackage bid documents to
allow the complete design packages to be bid earlier and allow more time for the other packages
to be completely designed.
The Owner needs to allocate its management resources more efficiently. The more
skillful and experienced staff needs to be involved in drafting the contracts before they are
awarded, rather than during construction to deal with spiraling problems caused by errors,
omissions, ambiguity and poor judgements made in the contract language.
Hold more pre-bid meetings with the bidders, during which questions and open
discussions are encouraged. More attention then needs to be paid to the bidders questions as
they usually offer clues about what is not clear in the contract. Finally, the answers to the
bidders questions must be clear, simple, identifying the intent of the contract language, and must
not dance around the issues. Unclear, unresolved issues would still have to be resolved later,
much more costly, during construction.
Liquidated damages clauses should be used in contracts that are less exposed to changes caused
by forces external to them, and contracts with a less dynamic nature, and a less uncertain scope
of work (i.e., underground construction).
Use incentive/disincentive clauses for projects that are more critical and need to be expedited for
the Owner (i.e., rebuilding a destroyed bridge). However, the project scope still has to be static
and less vulnerable to changes. Also, incentive/disincentive clauses shall be used only when the
Owner allows enough time for the bidders to prepare their bid price and analyze the project to
find the optimum schedule for it.
The Owner of a complex multi-contract project must be innovative in using alternatives to
liquidated damages provisions. The Owner may consider an implicit process to motivate the
contractor's performance without undermining its relationship with it contractors, or increasing
the project overall cost.
Examples of mechanisms that can mitigate liquidated damages and incentive/disincentive
provisions shortfalls are:
Restrict payments of certain bid items (i.e. the Mobilization bid item) to achieving certain
milestone(s).
Apply retention to interim milestone(s) the same way it is applied to substantial completion. The
percentages applied to milestones may vary based on the importance of each milestone.
Reduce and refund the retention that is applied to substantial completion as certain milestones
are achieved.
If these options fail or can not be applied, empower the Authorized Owner Representative to
direct the contractor to accelerate construction activities that are critical to the project. To reduce
potential claims and long negotiation time, this must be done on a time and material basis.
Also, the bid documents should include provisions to establish guidelines for calculating
productivity loss and efficiency factors due to acceleration, disruption, and crew overloading.
Thus, reduce the amount of time and efforts in negotiating and establishing these factors if the
contractor is directed by the Owner to accelerate construction tasks.
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